











Free trade in manufactures  is a reality in most industrial  coun-
tries.  There  is little  more  to gain  from  further  trade liberalization.
But there is much to lose from any retreat from the open
multilateral trading system, or even from thueats to  it. To
preserve  the system,  the benefits of free trade should  be made
more  tangible  through  better  domestic  structural  and
macroeconomic  policies  that  would  raise  growth  rates  and  lower
unemployment.
PolicyRcsasrchWoukingPapusdtsaenintdefindinsofwoipotmstdagic  theediangcofideasamongBankstaff  and
allothesincdsin  dcvcopneissues*Thcsepapem.distibutedbythoReaoarchAdvizoryaSuZf,cythemAmesoftheauthors,rdlect
orlyth  ibewsa,ndshouldbeusedandkitedaccoarglydo  efindingtrs,  isuapuonsgnaioranadof  s  m  emb  thearown.beyshould


















































































































.. ~~  ,
Trade  Polley
WPS  1098
This paper  is a product  of the Geneva  Office.  Copies  of the paper  are available  free  from the World  Bank,
1818  H StreetNW,  Washington,  DC20433.  Please  contactMona  St.  Leger,  room  R8-063,  extension  37148
(February  1993,  40 pages).
Developing  countries  sometimes  still resist free  percent  of manufacturing  production,  and their
trade because  of the alleged  protectionism  of  dollar  value was smaller  than Italy's.
industrial  countries  - a myth  belied  by facts,
says Baneth.  Granted,  some protectionism  persists  every-
where,  but it is an irritant  rather  than a true
Import  growth in the industrial  countries  obstacle  to trade.  For that reason,  further  trade
aiccelerated  during  the 1980s,  while  income  liberalization  can bring the industrial  countries
growth  slowed.  Outside  of agriculture  (only  little additional  benefit in tenns of faster  growth,
about  2 percent of GDP)  and with the possible  though  retreat  from free trade holds  huge
exception  of Japan,  free trade  - not  potential  losses.  Only improved  domestic
protectionism - is the reality.  policies - structural and macroeconomic - can
raise  investment,  accelerate  growth,  reduce
Despite  the  march toward  a frontier-less  u.nemployment,  and consolidate  support  for free
Europe,  EC manufactures  imports  from  trade.
nonmembers  rose faster  than intra-EC  trade, and
imports  from developing  countries  rose fastest.  Developing  countries  should  view the United
Similar  tendencies  prevailed  in North America.  States  and the European  Community  as open
This pattem  of imports  contradicts  the myth  of  markets  for  their manufactures  exports. Even  in
widespread,  effective,  and growing  bariers to  agriculture,  policy reform  over the present
manufactures  imports.  Protectionist  rhetoric  is up  decade  should  reduce inefficiencies.  Meanwhile,
because  imports  are irncreasing,  not because  trade  analysts  should  be careful  to disaggregate:
barriers  are rising.  The rising share  of developing  industrial  countries' agricultural  policies  that
countries,  despite  their often  weak  bargaining  have  truly  harmed  food exporters,  like Thailand,
positions,  shows  that multilateral  rules, rather  should  not be blamed for the ills of food import-
than bargaining,  threats,  and ccueater-threats,  still  ers, like most African  countries.
drive  the system.
Selective  trade restraints  may have blunted
In the 1980s,  manufactures  imports  rose to  but not countered  the dynamism  of newly
40 percent of manufacturing  production  in the  industrialized  countries  and accelerated  their
United  States  and to 25 percent in the European  shift toward more  sophisticated  exports. As their
Community  (not including  imports  from  EC  barriers  to manufactures  imports  are generally
members;  including  those, manufactures  imports  low,  the preferences  industrial  countries  grant  to
rose to 87 percent  of manufactures  production  in  developing  countries  carry similarly  low ben-
the United  Kingdom,  67 percent  in France,  and  efits.  They help  nascent  exporters  benefit from
53 percent in West  Germany).  But in Japan,  good  policies,  but they do not overcome  the
manufactures  imports  in 1990  were less than 12  handicap  of bad policies.
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Ranmant  proteciontsm  or rising bmnorts?
i. Ingrained  protectionism  in the developed  North is still sometimes used in developing  countries
as an argument  against  the benefits  of free trade ("they  would  not be doing  it i  it were not  good  for
them - and f it is goodfor them, It should  be goodfor us") and as a deterrent  to its practice  (free
trade  may be best  for all; but the North is not  practicing  it, and It takes  two to tango  "). In recent
years, marny  developing  countries  have in fact liberalizee  their trade policies,  and moved  towards
greater  reliance  on exports;  they  must  have  had faith  in the penetrability  of trade  barriers.  However,
the dirge lamenting  the demise  of free trade and the growth  of industrial  country  protectionism  has
been  taken up by professional  economic  analysts,  notably  those  of international  organizations.  The
same  song also accompanies  the slow-down  in the economic  growth  of industrial  countries,  and its
attendant  ills: urimployment,  lagging  wages,  growing  discontent.  To deal with these, further  trade
liberalization  is the main advice, often  the only advice,  of many  economists,
ii. This  paper  examines  the  behavior  of industrial  countries'  imports  in the 1980s,  in comparison  with
earlier  periods,  and in relation  to the evolutions  of domestic  aggregates  like GDP  and manufacturng
production.  Trade  policies  are not examined  directly,  but through  their impacts  on trade. The paper
fmds  tibat  import  growth  into the industrial  countries  accelerated  during  the very decade  when  their
domestic  growths slowed  down. It concludcs  that, with the possible  exception  of Japan, and the
certain  exception  of agriculture  (an  important  sector,  but one  that .evertheless  represents  well  below
3 percent  of industrial  country  GDPs)  the free trade  paradigw.  describes  reality  best - not  protection-
ism. Developing  countries  have  been  among  the  prime  beneficiaries  of this liberal  trade  environment.
Industrial  country  protectionism  cannot  be blamed  for the global  economic  ills of the 1980s. Its
further  reduction  or even  elimination  would  not  provide  much  room  for speedy  improvement.  Indeed,
far from being able to regain macroeconomic  dynamism through furter  trade liberalization,
industrial  countries  need  to redeem  dynamism  through  other means  in order to preserve  the liberal
trade regimes  they  have already  achieved.
The  European  Communit: a wide  open "fortress".
iii. The crescendo  of voices  deploring  growing  protectionism  has concentrated  much  of their vigor
on the European  Community  (EC),  as epitomized  by comments  about  emerging  "Fortrcss  Europe".
If indeed  European  protectionism  is vigorous,  growing  and effective,  its impact  should  be reflected
in the actual  evolution  of trade. In an environment  of rising  protectionism,  imports  should  fill, in
absolute  value  or at least  in relation  to income.  If protectionism  centered  around  the construction  of
a common  market, participants  should  increasingly  trade with each other, and rely less on other
imports.  If, as is often  said, developing  countries  are particular  targets  of protectionism,  their share
in the common  market  should  fall even faster  than import  shares  in general.
iv. The  Common  Agricultural  Policy  (CAP)  has indeed  protected  European  agriculture  from  imports;
the EC's  food and other agricultural  imports rose much less than intra-EC  trade in the same2
commodities.  However,  agriculture  accounts  for less  than 3 percent  of EC GDP. In industry,  free
trade has been the dominant  force. Manufactures  imports  into the'  Community  from non-members
rose more than trade in manufactures  among  members,  despite a.ie  surge in trade with the three
countries  that  joined  the Community  during  the period.  The dollar value  of imports  of manufactures
into the EC rose by over 150  percent  during  the decade'. Meanwhile,  the value of manufacturing
production 2 rose by  less than 60 percent. This openness  has been particularly beneficial  to
developing  countries,  whose share  in EC manufactures  imports  rose from 20 to 24 percent.
the U. S. and Japan
v. With some  variants,  these conclusions  also apply to the United  States. It too has exclusionary
agricultural  policies,  but is an open market  for manufactures,  and  has seen  the ratio of manufactures
imports  to its GDP and manufacturing  production  soar during  the supposedly  protectionist  1980s,
to "vels that now  exceed  those  of the EC considered  as a whole.  Just as EC imports  grew faster  than
intra-EC  trade, manufactures  imports  into North America  rose faster than trade in manufactures
between  the US and Canada. Nevertheless,  this mutual  trade remains  important;  excluding  it, the
ratios  of NXorth  America's  total imTports  and  manufactures  imports  to its combined  GDP  are somewhat
lower  than the EC's corresponding  ratios.
vi. Japan is in sharp contrast with the two other large trading areas. It too seems to have moved
towards  greater liberalism  in the 1980s,  and (contrary  to earlier periods)  its manufactures  imports
rose faster  than production.  Nevertheless,  in 1990 its manufactures  imports  were still sialler than
those  of Italy or Canada;  they amounted  to less than 12 percent  of industrial  production,  about 3
percent  of GDP, as against  40 percent  and 7 percent  respectively  for the US and 25 percent  and 6
percent for the EC, much larger entities with consequently  lower expected import ratios. By
comparison,  manufactures  imports  into the U. K., France and Germarny  amounted  to 87 percent,
67 percent  and 53 percent  of their manufacturing  productions.
vii. The data do not preclude  the persistence  of some  protectionist  measures,  the levying  on imports
of light  but persistent  tolls. Industrial  countries  are clearly  not free traders  in the Ricardian  sense,
nor even like Hong-Kong.  They also use a variety of subsidies;  in the EC, where they are best
documented  (if not necessarily  the most  widespread)  they  were estimated  to about  89 billion  ECUs,
well over $100 billions annually  in the period 1988-1990.  Some  of these are bound to be trade-
distorting.
'Throughoutthb paper, impons ioto  the BC  will refer to impos  from non-membercounties.  Inpots  of
EC members  from each other will be called intm-EC  trade',  or EC inka-trade.  For data sources,  ree Table
2.
2 The contribution  of the manufacturing  sector  to GDP.
'All data relate to the former  West Germany  only.3
for developing  countrv  manufacturesaexporters:  effaecivelv  free trade
viii. Nevertheless,  the observed  increase  in imports, its wide distribution  across sectors, and its
persistence  over the years contradict  any hypothesis  of rampant  protectionism  (except  perhaps  in
Japan),  of effective  and  growing  barriers  to manufactures  imports.  The faster  growth  of imports  from
developing  countries  (with  often  weak bargaining  positions)  indicates  that multilateral  rules rather
than bilateral  bargaining,  threats  and counter-threats,  still constitute  the motive  force of the system.
Protectionist  rhetoric  and  threats  there  have  been;  but their  very  frequency  signals  the rise in imports,
not in protectionist  barriers.  To  paraphrase  Huxley,  the stereotype  growing  protectionism  epitomized
by Fortress  Furope is another  beautiful  scientific  hypothesis  slain  by ugly facts.
ix. Developing  countries  should  view  the EC aiA the US  as open  markets  for manufactures  exports,
where  protectionism  against  non-agricultural  exports  is just a slight  frictional  cost. Agriculture  is a
different  story, of mostly  closed  and managed  markets.  But  here  too radical  change  is in the offmg,
and should  considerably  ret 'ce  the inefficiency  of this sector over the next decade. Meanwhile,
developing  countries collectively  benefit from the lower agricultural  prices brought about by
industrial  country  policies.  This is noted,  not as an argument  in favor  of these  policies,  but to stress
the importance  of disaggregation.  The troubles  of food  importers  like  Nigeria  should  not be blamed
on policies  that truly hurt food exporters  like Thailand.
x.  As overall  barriers  to imports  are low, most preferences  granted  to developing  countries  are of
similarly  low benefit.  Nevertheless,  they  have been of significant  help  to some  nascent  exporters.
They have also benefitted  from selective  trade restraints  on some of the exports of a few very
successful  exporters,  which  provide  them some  shelter  from their most effective  competitors,  and
at least marginally  accelerate  their entry into the manufactures  markets  of the industrial  economies
that grant them such preferences,  primarily  the EC. These restraints  may have blunted but not
countered  the dynamism  of the newly industrializing  countries;  most likely, they have accelerated
their shift towards  less labor-intensive  exports.
xi. These  data are fully  consistent  with a direct  examination  of trade policies  and tools. .'endencies
to tighten  them in the early 1980s  have been  effectively  resisted  and reversed;  in Europe,  the very
process  of unification  has been a force for broader  trade liberalism.  In the U. S. too, protectionist
noises  have generally  been  just that, not effective,  let alone rising,  barriers.
trade.  efficiency  and growth
xii. The importance  of trade policies  should  not  be minimized.  Further improvements  in them may
hold out little promise for widespread  benefits, because in  industrial countries they already
approximate  free trade. However, any retreat from the open multilateral  trading system, even
credible  threats to it, hold enormous  potential  for negative  impacts  on investment,  efficiency  and
incomes.4
xiii. In mosi industrial  economies,  manufactures  imports  rose much fas;er  than production  in the
1980s;  in many, the manufacturing  trade balance  tilted  to the negative.  Manufacturing  production
rose slowly at best. Manufacturing,  once a source of employment,  became  the major source of
unemployment.  As manufacturing  sectors  are already  open, further  opening,  even radical, cannot
give much impetus  to efficiency  or acceleration  to growth. In agriculture,  there is much  room for
trade liberalization,  but its low share  also precludes  such  an impetus  coming  from it.  Conversely,
low  growth  and low  investment  limit  the economic  benefits  of trade liberalization,  and maximize  the
social and political  costs of import  competition.  They  thus endanger  past gains.  One has to look  to
internal obstacles and to  macroeconomic  policies, not to  furtier trade liberalization,  to  raise
investment  shares  and boost growth  rates.5
I.  OVERALL  IMPORTS,  PRIMARY  COMMODITIES  AND  ENERGY.
1.  A funeral choir of  economists  has bemoaned  the demise of free trade and the rise of
protectionism  in industrial  countries  in the 1980s.  Yet  meanwhile,  the growth  of merchandise  imports
into industrial  countries  accelerated  sharply,  during  the very decade  when the growth  rate of GDP
fell to its lowest decennial  level since the Great  Depression.  From 4.4 percent during the period
1965-1980,  the annual  average  growth rate of imports into OECD countries  rose to 5.2 percent
during  the 1980s,  while the growth  rate of GDP fell from 3.7 percent  to 3.1 percent 4.
2. Table 1 shows  the implied  apparent  increase  in import  elasticity  from 1.11 during the 1965-80
period  to 1.67  during  the 198(;s  - hardly  a sign  of effective  import  restraints  or of surging  protection-
ism. Import  elasticity  rose in every  OECD  country  except  Switzerland.  In the US, it rose from 2.03
to 2.23. The palm  went to the EC's two  newest  members,  Spain  and Portugals.  Both  had below  unit
import  elasticities  before 1980, and 2.9 and 3.0 respectively  in the last decade  when  they moved  to
the  EC's liberal  import  policies. Even  Australia  and  New  Zealand,  though  they  still  have  abnormally
low import  ratios, liberalized  their trade policies  and raised  their import  elasticities,  Australia  from
.25 to 1.38 and New  Zealand  from .46 to 1.9.
3. The elasticities  in Table  1 are derived  from of import  and GDP growth  in constant  prices. While
often  useful, such estimates  are necessarily  ambiguous;  they depend, notably,  on the chosen  base
year. Also,  by abstracting  from  price fluctuations,  they  neither  describe  the impact  of import  growth
on exporters  (whose  earnings  may precede  or lag behind  volume  changes),  nor the relationship  of
import expenditure  to income  in the importing coantries. Growth rates in current prices are
influenced  by general inflation;  but ratios (notably,  those of imports to  GDP and to various
components  of it) do not have  that defect  and have  the additional  merit  of being  urmnbiguous  and
precise.  Of course,  they  too must  be treated  with  caution.  In particular,  a given  import-dependency,
relative  to GDP, signifies  more  open  trade  policies  for a larger  than  for a smaller  economy:  it stands
to reason  that, with a given  tightness  of trade  restraints,  the ratio  of imports  to GDP  would  be lower
for the US than  for Monaco!  This is well  illustrated  in Chart 1, which  shows  the logarithms  of GDPs
on the X-axis,  and the ratio of GDP  to all imports  and to manufactures  imports  on the Y-axis.  With
a few outliers (Belgium  an the Netherlands  for high ratios, New Zealand,  Australia  and Japan for
low ones)  the inverse  relationship  is striking.
4 WorldeDvelopmenRepon  1992, The  World  Bank,  Washington  DC, WDI Tables  2 and  14. Growth  rates
are in constant  1980  prices.
I Portugal  and  Greece  are EC members;  they and  Turkey  are  OECD members  but the  World  Bank  classifies
them with Developing Cowwies;  they are excluded from the averages for OECD members given  earliet in this
paragraph.6
TABLE  I
IMPORTS  AND  IMPORT  ELASTICrTES  OP INDUSTIUAL  COIRIEmrnu
....-----  1990  --------------------  1965-80  1980-90
GDP  fmjorts  manuf.jmrts  inport elasticity
GDP  GDP
Sbilltons
Ireland  42500  0.4874  0.409  0.98  1.16
N.  Zealand  42760  0.2214  0.188  0.46  1.90
Portugal  56820  0.4458  0.348  :  0.67  3.07
Greece  57900  0.3403  0.262  0.90  2.39
Norway  105830  0.2541  0.229  0.68  0.86
Denmark  130960  0.2410  0.195  0.61  1.65
Finland  137250  0.1970  0.164  0.78  1.38
Austria  157380  0.3174  0.283  1.42  1.52
Belgium  201113  0.5950  0.488  1.33  1.55
Switzerland  224850  0.3088  0.275  2.25  1.73
Sweden  228110  0.2390  0.203  0.67  1.59
Netherlands  279150  0.4510  0.352  :  1.12  1.84
Australta  296300  0.1341  0.121  0.25  1.38
Spain  491240  0.1781  0.139  0.96  2.90
Cana'ta  570150  0.2032  0.179  0.52  2.47
U. i.  975150  0.2306  0.194  0.60  1.58
Italy  1090750  0.1615  0.124  0.81  1.75
France  1190780  0.1953  0.158  :  1.08  1.45
Germany  1488210  0.2293  0.188  :  1.60  1.86
Japan  2942890  0.0786  0.056  :  0.76  1.37
U. s.  5392200  0.0956  0.077  :  2.03  2.23
North America  5962350  0.078  0.058
E. C.  60045'3  0.099  0.062  :
OECD  15728210.0  0.1566  1.11  1.67
6Source:  World Development  Indicators  (WDI),  the World Bank, Washington  D. C. 1992. The share
attributed  to mranufacures  imports  is  often different  from that  in GATT  data; they  probably  include  commodities
classified  by GATr as  emi-mranufactures.  Data on total imports  are very similar.
Data for Belgium  include  trade and GDP of Luxembourg.
Data  for *Nonth  America' exclude  trade  between  the United  States  and Canada.  Data for "BC- exclude  trade
among  EC member  countries.
Data for the 'OECD'  refer to country  averages  as shown  in WDI. They include  mutual  trade among OECD
members.  They  exclude  countries  not classified  as "high  income"  by the World  Bank, i.e. Turkey  (not shown
in the Table),  Greece and Portugal.
ISOURCE:  WORlD DEVELOPMENrINDICATORS.  WORLD  DEVEWLOPMNTREPORT1990,  theWorld
Bank, Tables  3 (GDP),  2 (growth  of GDP), 14 (unports  and  growth  of impots) and 15 (manuSfcturs  import)7
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times higher. Estimates of trade in commercial services are rather more imprecise than those of
merchandise trade, and must be treated with caution. As national data rarely indicate origins and
destination, adjustments for intra-EC trade and estimates of EC imports are unavailable. Mostly for
that reason, this Report concentrates on nmerchandise  trade; but the wisps of information available
on trade in services do not contradict its findings.
5. Considering only trade with non-member countries, the EC had an import/GDP ratio of over 9.9
percent in 1990, as against 9.6 percent for the United States 9. The ratio was 8 percent for Japan,
a much smaller economy with a poorer natural resource base. The EC is a major producer both of
energy (German coal, British petroleum and Dutch natural gas) and of agricultural commodities.  Yet
its imports of primary commodities  (including  energy) were higher, in proportion to GDP, than those
of the US (as was to be expected, given the large area and vast natural wealth of the United States)
and not much lower than Japan's (3.7 of GDP as against 4.6 percent).
Import  data rom  GATr except  when otherwise  indicated.  National  Account  GDP come  generally  from  the Wodd
Bank,  Wodd Tables  (WT), nd  are  convened  by taking  the Word  Tables  conversion  facton, which  are  esentally annual
average  exchane rates.  In a few cases, manufactuing  production  data  have  been obbtined  from the  World ak's World
Development  Indicators  (WDl).  Manufacturing  production  for the BC u  a whole  had  to be esmated, becauae  of a gap
ia count,  -At".
s  Except If otherwise  spe4ifled,  all references  to EC concem  the  twelve  pruent member  counties.  For the  ke of
simplicity,  import into  the EC from the outside  will  be refrred  to a  'imootsu.  Trade  among  BC meben  will  be called
ints-EC trmde,  or 'inta-trde'.8
TABLE  2  10
GDP, MANUFACTURING  PRODUCTION,  MANUFACTURES  IMPORTS  AND EXPORTS.
PART A  - I
BILLION  US DOLLARS  RATIOS
. .....  totat  manuf  manuf  manuf
imoorrt  Invort  ]Mort  oxoort
GDP  M'.  all  manufactures  :  GDP  GDP  manuf manuf
value  iwp.  imp.  exp.;  prod  prod
au  led 1980
AUSTRALIA  148  22  15  6 : 0.15  0.i0
AUSTRIA  77  22  24  17  15  : 0.32  0.22  0.75  0.65
FRANCE  652  179  135  73  81  * 0.21  0.11  0.40  0.45
GERMANY  819  301  187  98  162  : 0.23  0.12  0.32  0.54
ITALY  394  99  44  65  * 0.25  0.11
N.LANDS  168  49  101  41  37  ; 0.60  0.24  0.83  0.75
SPAIN  198  3(  13  15  : 0.17  0.06
UK  523  118  119  -71  82  : 0.23  0.14  0.60  0.69
JAPAN  1040  307  141  25  123  : 0.14  0.02  0.08  0.40
Us  2587  645  253  124  142  : 0.10  0.05  0.19  0.22
CANADA  253  48  59  41  30  : 0.23  0.16  0.86  0.62
N.  AM.  2840  693  229  111  124  : 0.08  0.04  0.16  0.18
EC  3125  939  389  146  241  0.12  0.05  0.16  0.26
intra-EC  385  263  0.12  0.08  0.28
total  EC  774  410  0.25  0.13  0.44
..........................................................................
AUSTRALIA 162  28  26  19  5  : 0.16  0.11  0.67  0.17
AUSTRIA  66  18  21  15  15  : 0.32  0.22  0.79  0.79
FRANCE  510  128  108  64  72  : 0.21  0.13  0.50  0.56
GERMANY  625  194  158  90  158 : 0.25  0.14  0.46  0.82
ITALY  359  88  41  67  : 0.24  0.11
N.LANDS  125  65  37  35  : 0.52  0.29
SPAIN  164  30  13  17 : 0.18  0.08
UK  454  100  73  66  0.00  0.16  0.73  0.66
JAri"m  1343  403  130  32  169  0.10  0.02  0.08  0.42
US  3962  792  361  251  154  0.09  0.06  0.32  0.19
CANADA  346  55  76  61  51  0.22  0.18  1.11  0.92
M. AM.  4308  848  314  222  116  0.07  0.05  0.26  0.14
EC  2532  671  315  140  228  0.12  0.06  0.21  0.24
intra-EC  349  237  0.14  0.09  0.35  0.00
total  EC  664  377  0.26  0.15  0.56  0.009
TABLE  2
PART  A - 11
GDP,  MANUFACTURING  PRODUCTION,  MANUFACTURES  IMPORTS  AND  EXPORTS.
BILLION  US  DOLLARS  RATIOS
-------------------------------------- total  manuf  manuf  manuf
Import 11Q2rt imoort  exoort
GDP  No"d. all  manufactures :  GDP  GDP  manuf  manuf
value  imp.  imp.  exp.:  prod  prod
added
1990
AUSTRALIA  296  44  42  32  15  : 0.14  0.11  0.71  0.34
AUSTRIA  157  41  49  41  37  :  0.31  0.26  0.99  0.89
FRANCE  1191  251  233  172  161  ; 0.20  0.14  0.69  0.64
GERMANY  1488  458  343  245  354  : 0.23  0.16  0.53  0.77
ITALY  1091  242  180  113  149  :  0.17  0.10  0.47  0.61
4.LANDS  279  57  126  89  78  : 0.45  0.32  1.55  1.36
SPAIN  491  124  88  62  42  :  0.18  0.13  0.50  0.34
UK  975  195  230  170  147  : 0.24  0.17  0.87  0.76
JAPAN  2943  849  235  100  275  :  0.08  0.03  0.12  0.32
US  5392  921  517  375  290  : 0.10  0.07  0.41  0.32
CANADA  570  67  116  93  73:  0.20  0.16  1.39  1.10
N.  AN.  5962  988  462  343  233  :  0.08  0.06  0.35  0.24
EC  6012  1488  594  373  439  0.10  0.06  0.25  0.47
intra-EC  818  630  0.14  0.10  0.42  0.00
total  EC  1412  1003  0.23  0.17  0.67  0.00
SOURCE:  WHEN  AVAILABLE,  GATT  TABLES  coplemented  with  WORLD  BANK  World  Development
EC  "manufacturing  production":  personal  estimate  based  on  incomplete national  data.
Total  inports  for  Italy,  Netherlands and Spran:  International  Monetary FUnd, International  FinanciaL
Statistics.10
PART B - I
CHANGES,  198U - 1990
BILLION  US  DOLLARS  RATIOS
GDP  KANUF. ALL  MANUFACTURES  :GDP MANUF.  TOTAL  MANUFACTURES
PRODUCT.  IMPTS  IHPTS  EXPTS:  PRODUCT.  IMPTS IMPTS EXPTS
AUSTRALIA  148  44  20  17  9  :100  16  26  -23
AUSTRIA  80  19  25  24  22 :104  85  100  142  154
FRANCE  539  71  98  100  80 :  83  40  73  137  99
GERMANY  669  157  155  147  192 :  82  52  83  151  119
ITALY  697  242  81  69  84 :177  81  155  129
N.LANDS  112  8  25  48  41 :  67  17  25  119  111
SPAIN  293  124  53  49  27 :148  157  382  180
UK  452  77  111  99  65  :87  65  93  138  80
JAPAN  1903  542  94  75  152 :183  176  67  299  124
US  2805  276  264  251  148 :108  43  104  202  104
CANADA  317  19  57  52  43  :125  38  97  125  144
N.  AM.  3122  295  234  232  110 :110  43  102  210  89




AUSTRALIA  14  4  4  -1 :  10  16  26  -23
AUSTRIA  -11  -4  -4  -2  0  :  -14  -17  -15  -13  1
FRANCE  -142  -52  -27  -9  -9  :  -22  -29  -20  -12  -12
GERMANY -194  -107  -29  -8  -4  :-24  -36  -15  -8  -3
ITALY  -35  0  -12  -3  2  :  -9  -12  -8  3
N.LANDS  -43  -49  -36  -4  -2 :-25  -100  -35  -10  -6
SPAIN  -34  0  -4  0  2  :-17  -12  0  14
UK  -69  -18  -119  2  -16 :  -13  -15  -100  2  -19
JAPAN  303  96  -11  7  47 :  29  31  -8  27  38
US  1375  148  108  127  12 :  53  23  43  102  8
CANADA  93  7  17  20  21 :  37  15  29  49  69
R.  AM.  1468  155  86  111  -7 :  52  22  38  100  -6
0
EC  -593  -267  -75  -7  -12 :  -19  -28  -19  -5  -511
PART  8 - II
CHANGES 1985*90
BILLION  US DOLLARS  :  RATIOS
GDP  MANUF.  ALL  MANUFACTURES  :GDP  MANUF. TOTAL  MANUFACTURES
PRODUCT.  IMPTS  IMPTS  EXPTS:  PRODUCT.  IMPTS  IMPTS EXPTS
AUSTRALIA  134  17  16  13  10  :  82  61  62  70  217
AUSTRIA  91  23  28  26  22  :  138  123  135  179  150
FRANCE  680  123  125  108  90  :  133  97  115  169  125
GERMANY  863  265  184  155  197  :  138  137  116  173  124
ITALY  732  242  92  72  82  :  204  105  177  122
N.LANDS  154  57  61  52  43  :  123  93  143  126
SPAIN  327  124  58  49  25  :  199  192  382  145
UK  521  95  230  97  81  :  115  95  133  123
JAPAN  1600  446  105  68  106  :  119  111  81  215  62
US  1430  129  155  124  137  :  36  16  43  49  89
CANADA  224  11  40  32  23  :  65  20  53  51  44
N.  AN.  1654  140  148  121  117  :  38  16  47  55  101
EC  3480  817  279  234  210  137  122  89  167  92
AUSTRALIA  148  22  15  6 :  0.15  0.10
AUSTRIA  77  22  24  17  15  0.32  0.22  0.75  0.65
FRANCE  652  179  135  73  81 :  0.21  0.11  0.40  0.45
GERMANY  819  301  187  98  162  0.23  0.12  0.32  0.54
ITALY  394  99  44  65 :  0.25  0.11
N.LANDS  168  49  101  41  37 :  0.60  0.24  0.83  0.75
SPAIN  198  34  13  15 :  0.17  0.06
UK  523  118  119  71  82 :  0.23  0.14  0.60  0.69
JAPAN  1040  307  141  25  123  :  0.14  0.02  0.08  0.40
US  2587  645  253  124  142  :  0.10  0.05  0.19  0.22
CANADA  253  48  59  41  30 :  0.23  0.16  0.86  0.62
N. AM.  2840  693  229  I1l  124  :  0.08  0.04  0.16  0.18
EC  3125  939  389  146  241 :  0.12  0.05  0.16  0.26
intra-EC  385  263  0.12  0.08  0.28
total  EC  774  410  0.25  0.13  0.4412
6. Though  import  elasticities  were rising  and much  higher than  unity, the ratio  of imports  to GDP
fell in the 1980s  in most industrial  economies,  as the relative  price of imports  fell. Relative  to the
industrial  countries' GDP deflators, the prices of energy and other primary commodity  imports
declined  throughout  the 1980s,  with  few  remissions,  to their  lowest  levels  in perhaps  a century.  Thus
expenditure  on such imports  fell more than import  volumes.  Even  those commodities  whose  usage
and imports  increased  faster than  GDP generally  fell in relation  to GDP in value  terms.
7. In fact,  the income-elasticity  of demand  for most energy  and  other  primary  commodities  has been
low in industrial  countijes. Material-saving  technical  progress has long been reducing  the raw
material  content  of production.  11  This long-term  phenomenon  accelerated  in the 1980s,  as energy-
saving  technological  change  (often  initiated  during  the preceding  decade)  matured, as the share  of
material  production  in GDP fell (the obverse  of the much-heralded  "services  revolution"),  and as
investment  shares  in GDP remained  depressed.  Primary  commodity  imports  were additionally  com-
pressed  by growing  energy  production  in the EC (petroleum  in Britain,  gas in the Netherlands  and
nuclear, mostly in France and Belgium)  and by agricultural  protection  policies  throughout  the
industrial  world, including  the EC's common  agricultural  policy  (CAP).
8. As a result, from 1980  to 1990  the ratio  of energy  and oth&r  primary  commodity  imports  to GDP
fell from 4.15% to 2.6% in the US, from 11.2%  to 4.6% in Japan and from 7.8% to 3.7% in the
EC. Intra-EC  trade performed  better, its ratio to GDP falling  only from 3.9% to 3.1%. Similarly
in North  America,  energy  and other  primary  commodity  trade  between  Canada  and  the United  States
actually  rose as a proportion  of their combined  GDPs, from 0.0067%  to 0.0077%.
" Neolithic  crafsan  had incred  one hundrd-fold  the  yield  of their  raw  material,  atone,  to 20 neters
of culting  edge per kilogmra,  from the  20 centimeten  obained by their paleolithic ncestor.13
II. IMPORTS  OF MANUFACTURES  BY THE EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES
9. import-dependency  for primary commodities  is (like for everything  else) partly influenced  by
policies,  like widespread  agricultural  protectionism,  the domestic  pricing  of energy  (low in the US,
high in Europe  and Japan), or subsidies  (like  those  for coal in Germany).  However,  they are more
closely  determined  by natural  mineral  wealth  endowments  and new discoveries,  the availability  of
agricultural  land and the suitability  of climate,  and similar  factors  not responsive  to policies.  The
value  and  share  of primary  commodity  imports  are also  heavily  dependent  on their fluctuating  prices.
Manufactures  imports  are much  more  responsive  to trade  policy. The  examination  of their  evolution,
in absolute  value and in relation  to various  other indicators,  reveals  more about  trade policies  than
that of primary  commodity  imports.
10. It is also more important.  The share  of primary  commodity  imports  in total  trade has long  been
falling.  Trade in manufactures  has been  the most dynamic  component  of total trade. For developing
countries,  it has been  the main engine  of ascent  to higher levels  of productivity  and incomes.  And
it is also against  manufactures  imports  that trade barriers are supposed  to have proliferated  in the
1980s.
11. The European  Community  was absorbing  three new members  during the 1980s. The single
European  Act was adopted,  and the expanded  EC was gearing  up for the introduction  of the fully
common  market  by 1992. It was presumably  because  of this that the term  "Fortress  Europe"  was
re-invented,  and it was claimed  that the EC, "driven  by ...  the fortress mentality  promoted  by
Europe  1992, [has]  become  increasingly  inward-looking"...  12.
12. The reality  of trade is in sharp contrast  with these images.  Manufactures  imports  into the EC
rose by 155 percent  during the decade. Intra-EC  trade in manufactures,  though given a vigorous
impulsion  by three new members,  and later by the march  towards  the completion  of the common
market  of 1993, nevertheless  rose by only 139  percent.  The difference,  while  small, is significant.
Manufactures  trade  between  EC member  countries  (like  trade  between  Canadian  provinces  or Swiss
Cantons)  may not be completely  free from discrimination,  but it is free tariffs and quantitative
restrictions,  and there are mechanisms,  actively  used, to combat  and eliminate  informal  and other
residual  internal  trade restraints.  If nevertheless  manufactures  imports  increased  faster  than  intra-EC
trade, the level and efficacy  of restraints  on imports  from the outside  cannot  have been very high.
Strange  "Fortress  Europe",  curious  "inward-looking"  behavior,  that allows  imports  from  the outside
to grow faster  than trade among  members  of the supposed  Fortress!
13. Though  the 1980s were a period of slow income  growth, economic  strains and protectionist
pressures, the ratio of manufactures  imports  to EC GDP rose from 4.7% to 6.2%. Even more
significant  is the relationship  of manufactures  imports  to manufactures  production" 3:  it rose from
"'World  Dank  Policy  Research  BuUetin,  May-July  1992,  p.3
" See  Footnote  I14
16 to 25 percent;  a 59 % increase  in the dollar  value  of manufactures  production  was accompanied
by a 155% surge in he dollar value of manufactures  imports. Far from slowing  down after the
proclamation  of the Single  European  Act, the growth  of maniufactures  imports  into the EC actually
accelerated  after 1985.
14. Nor was a wider "Fortress Europe" being formed. EC manufactures  imports from EFrA
members  rose by 146  percent,  marginally  more  than intra-EC  trade, but less than imports  from all
other sources. Manufactures  imports  from Japan, the target of the broadest  and sharpest  import-
resistance,  rose  by 215  percent  over  the period,  thus  increasing  the country's  share  both  over non-EC
and EC suppliers.  The United  States  did less well, but manufactures  imports  from that source still
rose by 115%,  much  more than  the increase  in manufactures  production.
15. What is true for manufactures  in general  is also true for the majority  of individual  sectors.  The
GATT  database  used in this Report lists  6 categories  of prihary products, 3 categories  of semi-
manufactures  (Iron and steel, Chemicals  and Other) and 13 categories  of Manufactures  (Annex table
2). Intra-EC  trade increased  more than imports  in primary commodities  and in semi-manufactures
other than iron and steel, but in only two categories  of finished  manufactures,  other transport
equipment  and textiles. In all other categories  of manufactures,  imports  rose more than intra-EC
Wade;  generally  much more (see  Annex Table  II.15
III. THE EC, THE UNITED  STATES  AND JAPAN IN COMPARISON.
16. In 1980, manufactures  imports amounted  to 4.8% of CDP and to 19.3% of manufacturing
production  in the US, and to 4.7% of GDP and 15.6%  of manufacturing  production  in the EC.
Given  the larger  sizes of the EC GDP and  manufacturing  sector,  the degrees  of openness  were quite
comparable.
17. US import  ratios  rose more  sharply  during  the decade,  to 7 percent  of GDP  against  the Commun-
ity's 6%. Two  thirds of Canada's  manufactures  trade is with the United  States, a higher  ratio than
that of intra-EC  over total imports  of EC members.  Considering  North America  as a single  zone
reduces the 1990 North American  ratio to 5.2 percent,  for a GDP similar in size to the EC's; a
decade  earlier, the  North American  ratio  was significantly  lower  than  the EC's. The contrast  relative
to manufacturing  production  is even  sharper,  as the US  import  ratio  doubled  over  the decade,  to over
40 percent.  The same  ratio also doubled  for North  America  as a vWhole,  rising  from 16  to almost  35
percent. Meanwhile,  the ratio of manufactures  imports  to manufacturing  production  rose to 25
percent  in the EC.
18. As Table 2 shows, manufactures  imports  into the US increased  extraordinarily  fast during  this
period,  by more  than  200%  in value  (the rise in Canada  was  a more  sedate  125%).  The  United  States
also stands  out in a different  way, iy the contrast  between  the fast rise in its manufactures  imports
and the slow rise in its manufacturing  production.  In dollar value, US GDP doubled  during the
decade (a greater increase  than the OECD  average),  manufacturing  production  (value  added)  rose
by a mere 43%  (less than  the OCDE  average)  and manufacturing  imports  trebled.
19.  able 2 brings  out major changes  in the relationships  of imports  and exports  to each other and
to manufacturing  production  in selected  industrial  countries.  In most,  the share  of manufacturing  in
GDP fell during  the 1980s.  This  was due  more to supply  than  to demand  conditions,  as is shown  by
steep increases  in manufactures  imports.  These were usually  very large relative  to the base year
value  of manufacturing  production,  and also relative  to the increase  in the value  of manufacturing
production  during  the period.  All but three  countries  also show  a reduction  in their  net manufactures
export surplus. The US shares  these syndromes  fully, but not to an exceptional  extent. Even the
increase  in its manufactures  trade deficit  by a quarter of its original  manufactures  production  is
exceeded  by the U. K. and probably  by Spain.  One after another  traditional  "industrial  countries",
long  net exporters  of manufactures,  turned  into net importers.  Such  large  import  increases  combined
with deteriorating  trade balances in  manufactures  signal difficult adaptation problems in the
manufacturing  sectors,  and may  well have  contributed  to them.
20. Three of the sample  countries  stand  out as exceptions  to the general  tendency:  Italy and, most
strongly, Germany  and Japan. Their manufactures  imports  also rose faster than production  and
exports;  indeed,  Japan's  manufactures  imports  rose 2.4 times  faster  than  its exports,  the highest  such
ratio  for the sample  countries.  However,  their manufactures  export  surpluses  at the beginning  of the
period were so high that they actually  increased  in absolute  dollar values.16
21. Part of this exoort surplus  in manufactures  was due to relatively  high shares  of manufactures
exports in GD)P  and in manufactures  production.  However,  in 1990,  when data are most complete,
Italy's and Japan's export ratios  were far from exceptional;  even  thcse of Germany  were exceeded
by the Netherlands  and Austria,  and almost  matched  by the U. K. More remarkable  are the relatively
low ratios of manufactures  imports  to production  that characterize  these countries.  The ratio is
egregiously  low in Japan; and low  by European  standards  even  in Italy and Germany.  The ratio of
manufactures  imports  to manufactures  production  is lower  in Italy than in Spain; and much lower
in Germany  than in France  or the U. K. (Table2!. Cause  or effect,  the more  competitive  exporters
have also better resisted  import  penetration.
22. In summary,  during  the 1980s  manufactures  imports  into industrial  countries  rose at exceptional
rates to exceptionally  high levels in relation  to GDP. Meanwhile,  domestic  manufacturing  sectors
were losing  in importance  relative  to GDP, not so much  because  of the increased  share  of services  -
a long-standing,  progressive  phenomenon  - but because  of the inability  of domestic  manufacturing
industries  to hang on to their shares  of domestic  and export markets.  This new phenomenon  has
sometimes  been  called "de-industrialization".  In the US as well  as the EC (and in most of the latter's
member countries) manufacturers  lost more markets to  imports than they gained in  exports.
Protectionist  rhetoric undoubtedly  increased;  but it increased  most in those countries  where net
imports  rose fastest. It was not only in the US that the rising stridency  of protectionist  rhetoric
signalled  a rising tide of imports,  whose  very strength  demonstrates  that the rhetoric  should  not be
mistaken  for the actual  rianifestation  of protectionist  policies.17
IV. MANUFACTURES IMPORTS FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
23. This import  expansion  was not confined  to industrial  country  suppliers.  Much has been said
about  a supposed  tendency  of trade  to gravitate  to industrial  countries,  to be internal  to manufacturing
branches  and even  to multi-national  firms, and  to concentrate  on high-technology  goods:  all reasons
to be concerned  about  its bypassing  developing  countries.  The accession  of the new Mediterranean
EC members,  themselves  developing  (Greece  and Portugal)  or just recently  developed  (Spain),  and
EC preferential  trade relations  with the seven members  of the European  Free Trade Association
(EFTA)  may  also  have  given  cause  for concern.  So  might  the preferential  trade relationship,  develop-
ing into a free trade area, between  the US and Canada,  and bilateral  pressures  by industrial  country
trading  partners  on Japan.
24. In reality, manufactures  imports  from developing  countries  grew much faster than imports" 4
from industrial  countries  into all three major trading areas. In the EC, their dollar value rose by
207% from 1980  to 1990  while  manufactures  imports  from industrial  countries  rose  by 142%.  Even
Japan,  the most dynamic  industrial  country  source  of EC manufactures  imports,  did only marginally
better than developing  countries did overall. 15 The phenomenon  is widespread  across sectors.
Among  finished  manufactures,  only in "other  transport  equipment"  (much  influenced  by aeronautic
products)  and in power  generating  machinery  did developing  countries  do somewhat  less well than
industrial  country  exporters.  While  textiles  and clothing  imports  from  developing  countries  rose only
marginally  faster than  from other sources, in sectors like machinery  (other than  power-generating)
and office equipment,  their shares  rose substantially  both relative  to intra-EC  trade and to other
industrial  country  suppliers.  EC imports  of "machinery  and transport  equipment"  from developing
countries  now  much  exceed  those  of textiles  and  clothing.  The overall  share  of developing  countries
in EC manufactures  imports  rose from about 19 percent in 1989  to about  24 percent  in 1990.
25. Similar findings  can be made for the US and Japan. In these markets,  the 1980 shares of
developing  countries  were about  twice as high as in the EC; in both, they rose faster  than imports
from other sources.  Already  in 1980,  developing  countries  collectively  supplied  more manufactures
to the US ($33  billions)  than  did either  Japan  ($32 billions)  or the EC ($31  billions),  while in Japan
developing  countries  ($7 billions)  preceded  the EC ($6 billions)  and followed  the US ($9 billions).
In 1990, developing  countries  vastly  increased  their  advance  in the US  market  ($131  billions,  against
$91 billions from Japan and $71 billions  from the EC), and acquired  one in Japan ($34 billions
against  29.6 from  the US  and 29.2 from  the EC). While  there  are differences  in the relative  strengths
of developing  countries  in the three markets,  the breadth  of their advance  is general. Inclusion  of
"Eastern  Europe"  would  obviously  increase  the shares  of developing  countries,  and  mostly  lower  the
"  Except when otherwise indicated  'Developing  Countries' include the high-income  Middle and Far Easterm
economies  (other than Japan)  and  China; they exclude  Eastern  Euope.
'5  SOURCE:  GATr data files (see Annex  Tables).18
1980-90  growth rates. Either of these effects would be significant,  however, only for iron and
steel' 6.
26. Developing  country success in penetrating  industrial  country markets for manufactures  was
broad-based  by country  origin too. The Asian "tigers"  continue  to dominate  developing  country
manufacturing,  and their share  remains  heavy. They are rapidly  joined by exporters  from the rest
of Asia (most  prominently  China, whose  exports  of manufactures  to the EC quadrupled" 7, but also
Thailand,  Indonesia,  Malaysia...). However,  many  other developing  countries  also did better than
the traditional industrial  country exporters. Even in the EC manufactures  imports from Latin
America,  though small,  rose faster than imports  from North America;  in the US, their share  rose
from 5.4% to 8 percent, not all from Mexico. New manufactures  exporters  have appeared, like
Bangladesh,  Morocco,  Mauritius...
27. Twelve  developing  countries  appear  on GATT's list of "leading  exporters  of manufactures"' 8.
All  but one of them have  increased  their shares  in the 1980s. Thailand  raised  its global  market  share
six-fold,  from 0.1 to 0.6 percent;  debt crisis-tom  Mexico  raised its share  two and a half-fold,  from
0.4 to 1.1 percent;  even  India's share  increased  from  0.4 to 0.6 percent.  Brazil  alone  just maintained
its share  - a better  performance  than  that of most industrial  countries.
28. Developing  countries  could not have  made  such progress  if there  had been much  discrimination
against their exports to industrial  countries. Undoubtedly,  some restrictive  measures  have been
directed  against  the most  dynamic  exporters,  mostly  Japan  and  some  other  Asian  countries.  That  they
were still  among  the most  dynamic  is an indication  that  most such  measures  had  more  bark than  bite.
They may  have  slowed  down  their overall  export  growth,  without  preventing  them from continuing
to increase  their market shares.  More likely,  they  have caused  the composition  of the manufactures
exports  of these  countries  to change,  often accelerating  movement  towards  more dynamic  sectors.
29. In any case, such selective  protection  has not harmed  developing  country  exporters  in general.
It forms  part of a pattern  of preferences  offered  to developing  countries.  Almost  all benefit  from  the
general  scheme  of preferences  (GSP).  In the EC, "Least  Developed"  countries  get specific  additional
benefits:  e. g., a waiver of  Multifiber  Agreement  (MFA)  restrictions.  Almost seventy  African,
Caribbean  and Asian  (aC~) countries,  signatories  of the "Lome"  agreements,  receive  financial  help
and even  more preferential  trade treatment.  The inclusion  of trade  preferences  in such a network  of
links boosts confidence  in their durability.  Close  free trade area and even closer association  agree-
ments  link the EC to most Mediterranean  countries,  and now  to four  East European  ones;  a similar
arrangement  is being negotiated  with the Persian Gulf countries. Specific  exemptions  from all
6 On EC  relations with East Europe,  see also section ...  inWa.
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restrictions  for "outside  processing"  of garments  also  benefit  markets  with  special  links,  North  Africa
in the case of France (Morocco  has now overtaken  Italy as the largest garment  supplier  to that
country),  East Europe  for Germany.
30. These  arrangements  provide  a margin  of actual  preference  to a broad  range  of potential  suppliers.
The margin  is small,  because  the general  regime  is liberal:  even  complete  exemption  f-jm tariffs  of
4% is not a determining  factor; it certainly  cannot  overcome  more than the most modest  handicaps
of domestic  conditions  and  policies.  Only  a handful  of countries  have  actually  derived  sizable  benefits
from these  preferences.  Mauritius  is the outstanding  case  among  ACP countries,  Bangladesh  among
the least developed,  Morocco, Tunisia  and Turkey  among  the Mediterranean  countries.  All these
countries  helped  themselves,  and  were additionally  assisted  by "infant  exporter"  benefits  derived  both
from explicit  preferences  granted to them, and from mild protection  directed against  the most
dyniamic  exporters.  Even some  of the NIEs,  targeted  by such  protective  measures,  may  not have  lost
mort from them than they  gained  from similar  measures  more energetically  targeting  Japan.
31. Except  for the GSP, such differentiated  and more favorable  treatment  of developing  countries
has been less prevalent  in the other two large markets.  Mexico  has greatly benefitted  from special
export zone  agreements  which, in effect,  place certain  Mexican  manufacturers  into the US custom
zone; Caribbean  countries  have  derived  some  benefit  from the Caribbean  Basin  Initiative,  an export
processing  arrangement  similar  to the EC's outside  processing  arrangements.20
V.  A CASE STUDY: TEXTILES, CLOTHING AND THE MFA.
32. The Multi-fiber  Agreement  (MFA) is probably  the best known set of restrictions  targeting
developing  countries.  Various studies  have pointed at its cost, both for consumers  in industrial
countries  and for exporters.  Yet trade throws  another  light  on these estimates.
33. "Though  being a member  of the MPA, Switzerland  has not resorted to quantitative  import
restrictions"' 9 on textiles  and clothing.  Yet "the vast majority  of Switzerland's  imports in textiles
and clothing  are registered  as being from EFTA countries  or the EC  .."20.  Even after correction
for indirect  imports,  the GATT Secretariat  estimates  that 30 percent of Switzerland's  textiles  and
clothing  imports  come  from developing  countries,  including  East  Europe.  Japan  is another  industrial
country  that does not apply  quantitative  restrictions  to textiles  and clothing  imports.  The 1990  share
of developing  countries  amounted  to 81 percent  in its imports  of clothing,  and to 58 percent in its
textiles  imports.  Both shares  have  been falling  in the 1980s.
34. By contrast  with these  countries,  the US  does apply  MFA restraints  on imports  from developing
countries. Yet 89% of US clothing  imports and 54 percent of US textiles imports came from
developing  countries  in 1990,  a larger  overall  shares  of developing  countries  in textiles  and clothing
imports  that are larger, per capita, than those of either of the two unrestricted  importers. The
proportion  for the EC was 75 percent  for clothing  and 45 percent  for textiles,  much  higher than in
unrestricted  Switzerland  and only marginally lower than in Japan, a difference surely easily
explicable  in terms  of Japan's (and  to some  extent  even  the US's) greater  proximity  to dynamic  East
Asian  exporters.  The actual  import  picture  is fully  consistent  with the hypothesis  that the MFA does
not actually  significantly  restrict  textiles  and clothing  imports  from developing  countries.  However,
the MFA may  well accelerate  the re-orientation  of industrial  country  textiles  and clothing  imports
towards  nascent  exporters,  and, in the EC, towards  exporters  that  benefit  from special  preferences.
Thus Morocco, Tunisia  and  Turkey, and also Bangladesh  and Mauritius  have higher shares  even
of developing  country  exports  in the EC than in Switzerland  or Japan.
35. Estimates  of the costs of protection  to developing  countries  greatly rely on auctions  of export
licenses  in Hong-Kong  markets.  Hong-Kong  remains  the world's  largest  clothing  exporter,  but  it has
lost  market  shares,  both  worldwide  and in industrial  country  markets.  Its clothing  exports  to the EC,
for instance,  rose by 130  percent in value  in the 1980s,  to $4.3 billion,  while EC clothing  imports
from all sources  rose by 183  percent,  to $27 billions.
36. Yet this loss of market  shares  need  not have  been  caused  by MFA  restrictions.  Hong-Kong,  now
a high income country  with a fully employed  labor force would in any case surely have moved
"9  Tro4  Poicy  nn4ew,  SW7ZERL4N,  General Ageement  on Tariffs and Trade,  GENEVA December
1991, Vol I p. 165.
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towards  higher  value  exports.  A comparison  with  Italy  is instructive.  Italy,  the world's second  largest
exporter  of clothing,  remains  the largest  intra-EC  exporter.  It is, of course,  free of all internal  duties
and  restraints.  Relative  to unrestricted  Italy,  Hong-Kong  gained  market  shares  In the E3C.  The value
of Italy's clothing  exports  to the EC market  was 75 percent  higher  than  Hong-Kong's  in 1980;  only
67 percent  higher in 1990.
37. In summary,  the actual  evolution  of trade in manufactures  and of the developing  country  shares
in it provide no evidence  of the impact  of supposed  discrimination  against developing  country
exporters.  On the contrary,  this evidence  is fully  consistent  with the hypothesis  of substantially  non-
discriminatory,  and sometimes  even differentiated  and more favorable, treatment  of developing
country  exporters  in a rapidly  expanding  world market.
38. How can this be reconciled  with oft-told  tales of rampant  protectionism  targeting  developing
countries?  Part of the explanation  is that these  tales are wildly exaggerated,  bear on very limited
occurrences,  or recount  publicity  rather  than  substance;  there  is sometimes  less  to protectionism  than
meets the eye. One may recall that certain  EC restrictions  were invoked  162  times aigainst  Hong-
Kong's textiles  and clothing  exports  over the past decade, and this sounds  daunting.  It sounds  less
daunting  when  one adds  that 112  of these  occurrences  involved  Ireland,  hardly  a major market,  and,
not incidentally,  a country  whose 1990  per capita income  was 20 lower  than Hong-Kong's 2 l.  Such
losses  as do actually  occur may  well be concentrated  on a few  dynamic  exporters  that take them in
stride, often by accelerating  their move  to higher  technology  sectors.
'  World  BSuk  Aa-method. WX0l  1992,  op. cit.22
VI.  THE  DETERMINANTS  OF  IMPORTS:  GRWOTH  AND  EXCHANGE
RATES
39. Trade patterns  differed  markedly  in the two halves  of the 1980s.  Both  their actual  evolution  and
the numbers  reflecting  it were much influenced  by the decade's  wild gyrations  in exchange  rates.
Following  its depreciation  relative  to European  currencies  after 1970,  the dollar rose sharply  from
1980  to 1985.  The Yen  tended  to move  with the dollar  during  this  period,  first appreciating  less  than
European  currencies  (and more  reluctantly)  from 1970  to 1980,  then  depreciating  less  from 1980  to
1985. After 1980,  the real exchange  rates  of most developing  countries  (not shown  in Table  4) also
depreciated  quite  sharply  relative  to the US  dollar  and  the Yen; relative  to the  DM, there  was modest
depreciation  for some  currencies  (Latin  America),  appreciation  for others, notably  the dollar and
Yen-linked  currencies  of Asia.
40. In the late 1980s  the DM-dollar  relationship  returned  to roughly  its 1980  level.  This  time  the Yen
appreciated  with the European  currencies.  Korea  and Taiwan's  exchange  rates moved  up relative  to
the dollar,  though  down  relative  to the  Yen and  DM. Most  other  developing  countries'  real exchange
rates followed  the dollar, and some (notably  China's and India's) even continued  to depreciate
relative  to it.
TABLE 3.
NomiNAL  AND  REAL EXL-HANGE  RATES.
1970  1975  1980  1985  1990
DM  per $  3.66  2.46  1.82  2.94  1.62
100 YEN per $  3.60  2.97  2.27  2.39  1.45
YEN per DM  98.4  120.7  124.7  81.3  89.38
REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES RELATIVE TO THE DOLLAR.
(1985=1.00)2
1980  1985  1990
DM  1.459  1.000  1.575
YEN  1.331  1.000  1.507
DM/YEN  1.096  1.000  1.045
41. The  appreciation  of the dollar  during  the early  1  980s caused  the dollar  value  of
EC  GDP  production  to fall by 19 percent  from 1980  to 1985,  and  that of manufactur-
1 Source:  DnDnSdonALnandG  a&Lcsa  Yearbook  1992, Inteional  Monetary  Fund,  Wshlzgton  DC,
p. 99. Basd on relative  wholeal  prices; rccalculated  to bo expresd in ratio  of US Dollar  and DM.23
ing production to fall by 28 percent. Manufactures  imports also fell, but by only 4.5%
in dollar value. This sharp Increase in the relative price of imports contributed to
raising their  ratio to  manufacturing production from  15.6 to  20.8%.  In domestic
currency  (using  the  DM  for  all  European countries),  the  relationship is  more
impressive:  the DM value  of EC  manufacturing  production rose by 16 percent, that of
manufactures imports by 55 percent.  Meanwhile, US manufactures imports rose
particularly sharply during the first half of the decade,  as fiscal and payments  deficits
exploded  and the dollar became  increasingly  overvalued.  The dollar value  of manufac-
tures imports more than doubled  in five years, while manufacturing production rose
by just over 23 percent. In Japan,  the dollar value of manufacturing  production, GDP
and manufactures imports all rose by about 30 percent.
42. During the second half of the 1980s, the dollar declined and US import growth
slowed down - though its 50 percent increase  over five years was still much higher
than the increase  in GDP  (36 percent)  or manufacturing  production (15 percent).  The
ratio of manufactures  imports to GDP  and to manufacturing production continued to
rise, no doubt reflecting both relative price changes  and continued volume increases.
43. In the EC, the mechanical  effects of dollar depreciation, combined with modest
recovery from the earlier  recession,  caused  the dollar values of GDP  and manufactur-
ing production to rise by 137 and 122 percent respectively from 1985 to 1990. The
dollar value of manufactures  imports rose  even faster than in the US  during its period
of  currency appreciation, by  167  percent. In  local  currency  (DM),  imports of
manufactures rose by 46 percent, and manufacturing production by 22  percent. In
Japan, where earlier manufactures  imports nad risen less fast than production and
incomes,  from 1985 to 1990 they increased  by over 90 percent in YEN terms, while
GDP and manufacturing production both increased  by about 30 per cent. In dollar
value, manufactures  imports  trebled over  these five years, when currency  appreciation
(i. e. cheap imports) and booming domestic demand may  have been heiped by
deliberate  Government  stimulus to imports.
44.  Currency appreciation is  an  effective  tool  for  stimulating imports,  but  its
mechanical  vailuation  effects partly hide its impact to the analyst. The real phenome-
non of the rising purchasing power of GDP  and incomes draws in imports; but the
valuation effect of currency appreciation tends to reduce their ratio to  GDP. The
import surges consecutive to the appreciation of EC  and Japanese  currencies after
1985  were  partly  disguised by  the  rise in  the  dollar value of  their  GDPs and
manufacturing productions. Obviously, the  import surge was quite visible to  the
domestic manufacturers  who tried to compete.24
TABLE  4.
PURCHASING  POWER  PARITIES  (PPP), PRICE  LEVELS,
AND THE RELATIONSHIP  OF IMPORTS  TO GDP AT INTERNATIONAL  PRICES.
RELATIVE PRICES  (US  - 100)
1980  1985  1990
Japan  106  93  135
U.  S.  100.  100  100
EC  116  78  118
"REAL" CDPS
BILLIONS "INTERNAZIONAL DOLLARS" AND [NOMINAL  DOLLARS) n
Japan  999  (10401  1432  (1343]  2180  (29431
US  2587  125871  3962  (39621  5392  (53921
EC  2781  13125]  3259  (25321  5081  (60121
RATIOS OF ALL IMPORTS TO "REAL"  GDP AND [NOMINAL  GDP]
Japan  0.141  (0.135]  0.090  [0.096]  0.108  (0.0801
us  0.098  (0.098]  0.091  (0.091]  0.096  (0.096]
EC  0.140  [0.125]  0.096  [0.124]  0.117  (0.099)
RATIOS OF MANUFACTURES IMPORTS TO "REAL" GDP AND (NOMINAL  GDP]
Japan  0.025  (0.024]  0.022  (0.0241  0.046  (0.034]
U. S.  0.048  (0.0481  0.063  (0.0631  0.070  [0.0701
EC  0.052  (0.047)  0.043  (0.055]  0.074  (0.062]
2  PPP  data  for 1980  and 1985  are  from  WORLD  COMPARISONS  OF  PURCHASNG  POWFA  AND  REAL
PRODUCT  FOR  1980,  Pae  IV  of the  ternmtiona  Comparison  Project,  Buostat nd  Umted  Nations,  New
York,  1986  and 1989.  Data  for  individual  countdea  were ggregated  to form  EC  GDP,  which  wa then  divided
by  the nominal  GDP  aregate  in  the same  source  to obtain  the BC-wide  price  ntio. The  aveage  price  ratio
so  obtined, and that  directly  obtained  for Japan,  wa then applied  to the  GDP data  usd  elewhere in this report
(which  are slightly  different  from thos of the ICP project)  to obtain  GDPs in linternationall  dollars for 1980.
Price and *reall GDP  data for 1990  am preliminary  resultu  of the OECD intemational  comparisom  project.25
45. "International  dollars" are calculated  by the International  Comparison  Project
(ICP), and purportedly  reflect equal  purchasing  power  parities (PPP)  by correcting
for price  differences,  somewhat  like "constant  dollars"  correct  for price changes  over
time. Conventionally,  the US is taken as numeraire  (like a given  year is chosen  as
base year for constant dollars). Table 5 above shows  the relative price changes
brought  about  by the currency  movements  of the 1980s.  24
46. While recognizing  the serious practical and theoretical  difficulties  related to
"international"  dollars  and  their calculation,  the  behavior  of imports  relative  to GDP's
expressed  in "international"  dollars  is significat!ve.  Deliberately  or otherwise  raising
the foreign  exchange  price of dornestic  product  through  currency  appreciation  tends
to draw  in imports  but  mechanically  depresses  their  relationship  to nominal  GDP  (and
vice versa). The use of "international"  dollars  tears away  this exchange  rate veil.
47. From 1980 to 1985, the fall in relative  domestic  prices in Europe and Japan
mechanically  raised  the ratio of imports  to nominal  GDP;  but the corresponding  rise
in relative import  prices depressed  real import demand, and thus accelerated  the
decline  in demand  for primary commodity  imports  and temporarily  countered  the
secular  rise in the ratio of Europe's manufactures  imports  to its GDP.
48. As a result, while  overall  imports' share  in GDP remained  almost  stable in the
US (where  it was boosted  both by dollar  appreciation  and  by expansionary  financial
policies), the share of total imports  and of manufactures  imn  3rts in "real" GDP
sharply  fell both in Europe  and in Japan.
49. Conversely,  over the next period of currency appreciation,  import rise was
amplified;  the relative  cheapness  of manufactures  imports  helped  raise demand  for
them, almost  doubling  their ratio to "real" GDP in Japan, raising  it by  half in the
EC. Meanwhile,  the rise in the price of imports  slowed  down  their penetration  into
the US; the ratio  of manufactures  imports  to GDP,  which  had risen from .048  to .063
points in the first half of the decade  rose to just .070 in the second  half. By the end
of a decade  of see-sawing  exchange  rates and fluctuating  but rising import ratios,
both total and  manufactures  imports  were somewhat  higher  in the EC than  in the US
in relation  to "real" GDP. On both accounts,  the correction  reduces,  but does not
eliminate  Japan's differences,  all the more  remarkable  (as noted  earlier)  as Japan's
much smaller  economy  would, ceterts  paribus, need  more imports.
I Some  may have  expected  greater  pr3ce  divernces between  the US and the EC. but in 1980 eveal EC
member  countes acaaly had  lower price  levels  than  the US (Ireland,  lly,  Greece,  Portugal,  Spain).26
VI.  IMPORTS, EFFICIENCY AND DE-INDUSTRIALIZATION
50. Thus at one time or another, during the early or the latter part of the decade,
manufactures  imports  surged  in the three large economies.  Meanwhile,  the growth
of industrial  production  generally  slowed  down: among  major industrial  countries,
only Germany's  and  Japan's industrial  production  increased  as mush  as in the 1970s:
the index of industrial  production  (relating  to the "volume"  of production)  rose by
19% in Germany,  as against 18% in the 1980s;  by 49% in Japan, as against  the
previous  decade's  5O%21.  Elsewhere,  production  lagged,  imports surged  and (with
the exceptions  again  of Japan  and Germany, and also of Italy)  manufacturing  trade
balances  deteriorated.
51. When the share of imports soars, and import  and export increases  are also
considerable  relative  to the overall domestic  market size, there must be at least a
suspicion  of considerable  competitive  strains on domestic manufacturing,  and of
substantial  restructuring.  In some  cases,  this was partially  disguised,  for a time, by
surges in overall  domestic  demand,  causing  domestic  production  to rise even  when
its market  share  was falling. Such  may have  been the case in the  United  Kingdom
during  the early 1980s,  when its economy  was fuelled  by Thatcherian  reforms  and
rising  oil revenues,  and  in the United  States  during  the same  period.  It also  happened
in Germany  in the late 1980s  and early 1990s,  when imports  rose under  the impact
of the rising  budget  deficit  associated  with reunification.  Even when attenuated  by
currency  appreciation,  as has now happened  in Germany  and earlier in the US, the
salve provided by domestic  demand  can be quite soothing.  However, it is rarely
sustainable  when it is accompanied  by growing  balance  of payment  deficits.
52. The  relationships  of import  penetration,  export  growth  and  industrial  restructuring
are not the topic  of this paper. They  are undoubtedly  complex.  There  is considerable
evidence,  notably  rising  unemployment  despite  stagnant  or falling  real  manufacturng
wages,  that  in few industrial  countries  was the relationship  a happy  one in the 1980s.
One may then wonder if freer trade always speedily leads to greater domestic
welfare.
53. The classical  economists'  argument,  in the simplest terms, goes thus: if an
industry  cannot compete,  if it has no com;parafive  advantage,  then the factors  of
production employed  in  it can be more productively  and more remuneratively
employed  in other industries.  The national  economy  will gain from such changes
imposed  by competition;  and so will the factors  of production,  including  labor, once
it overcomes  the psychic  cost of moving  from one sector  (or location)  to another.
ts SOURCE:  Intmational Fuanial Statigtici  (EPS),  Yeaibook  199227
54. There is no gainsaying  this argument  - in the long  run: the economist's  long run
defined  as the time it takes for factors  of produiction  to be redeployed.  Much of the
capital stock can only be redeployed  as it is renewed. This is self-evident  for
specialized  machinery.  It is also the case  for much infrastructure:  even if roads can
carry  all sorts  of traffic  and  houses  provide  dwellings  to all sorts  of people,  they  need
to be in the right  places.
55.  Investment  levels, through which capital is  renewed and expanded, were
particularly  low in the 1980s, as is well illustrated  by Chart 2.26  Data on sectoral
shares  are more  difficult  to come  by, but, like  the share  of manufacturing  production
in GDP, the share  of manufacturing  investment  in GDP  seems  in general  also  to have
fallen  within  the lower  total, in keeping  with the supposed  services  revoilon  of the
1980s.
Figure 2 INDUSTRIAL  COUNTRIES:  SHARES  OF INVESTMENT  IN GDP.
CHART I I.
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56. Of the lower  manufacturing  investmen.,  more  had to go to meet the double  chal-
lenge of new competition  from imports, and new technologies.  Much investment
aimed  at reducing  the costs  of producing  the same  volume  of products,  i.e. producing
26Source: Worl  Tabls and  Imemadonal  Financial  &a&dscs,  op. cit.28
them with less labor, and often  also with less energy  and other raw materials.  The
new capital available  to complement  resources freed by modernization  and those
rendered  redundant  by competition  has been scarce  indeed.
57. Why was investment  so low? Protectionism,  particularly  heightened  protection-
ism, cannot  have  had much  to do with it, given  increased  import  elasticities,  rising
imports and deepened  import penetration.  Other constraints  must have operated.
Some  may  be important  - including  continued  domestic  distortions  and inefficiencies  -
but there is no reason  to believe  their influence  to have been any stronger  than in
earlier decades.
58. Three factors may well have played  particularly  strong  roles: macroeconomic
policy  failures;  exchange  rate instability;  and trade competition  itself
59. Its newly anti-inflationary  stance  and resulting  high real interest rates are the
aspects  of macro-economic  policy  that  have  drawn  most  comments;  but other  features
also distinguished  the 1980s  from earlier decades.  Without  examining  them in any
depth  here (for  which this paper is not the proper place)  one can note  that business
confidence  in the continued  ability  of governments  to ensure  steady  growth  has fallen
to  its lowest levels since the Great Depression. The expectation  of periods of
recession  or slow  growth  depresses  expected  rates of return  just when interest  rates
are at their highest.
60. Exchange  rate instability  and the related  uncertainty  play a part in this;  they  also
directly depress the  expected value of  retums to  investment. Exchange rate
fluctuations  do not immediately  fully  translate  into price changes:  at the 1985  height
of the dollar, European  passenger  cars were priced  twice as high in North America
as in their home  markets.  But  whether  translated  into lower  prices, higher  profits  or
the ability  to bear  higher marketing  costs, competitive  positions  are radically  altered
in ways  that industrialists  can neither  influence,  nor forecast,  nor shield  themselves
from. Overall,  the risks  of new investment  are heightened;  expected  rates of return
are depressed.
61. About  a fourth  of the EC's external  trade in manufactures  is with North  America,
and  about  as much  again  with  more  or less  dollar-linked  Asia. Exchange  rate  changes
directly affect the profitability  of exports to these markets. They also affect the
profitability  of a more or less broad  range of import-competing  industries.  Even in
third countries,  with which  bilateral  exchange  rates  may  be stable,  for instance  EFTA
countries and Japan, the  fluctuating competitivity  of  dollar-based competitors
represent  additional  risks.
62. These  risks are less sharply  perceived  by US manufacturers  - witness  the quasi-
absence  of exchange  rate news  from American  media, in contrast  to the large space29
devoted  to them in Europe  and  Japan. They  may  therefore  have  less influence  on US
investmeiit  decisions.  The US may actually  be spared  some of the macroeconomic
instability  and  terms  of trade  fluctuations  linked  to exchange  rate  movements,  because
the short run price of its main primary import, petroleum,  is fixed  in dollars. US
manufactures  are,  however, also much affected, mostly through imports from
Western Europe and Japan (equivalent  to about 20 percent of US manufacturing
production).
63. Pressure  on profits  has been  amplified  by import  competition,  from new  and  low-
cost suppliers. Industries and firms able to re-orient  themselves  towards export
markets  were able  to preserve  or enhance  economies  of scale. Often,  however,  both
when  attacking  difficult  export  markets  and  defending  besieged  home  markets,  profit
margins  were compressed.  Lean profits  generate  effective  pressures  for moderniza-
tion, better  use of labor and  capital,  and improved  management;  but  they  also reduce
firms' ability  to generate  or attract  the capital  needed  for effective  improvements,
particularly  when borrowed  capital  is expensive,  and when investment  prospects  in
foreign  manufacturing  seem  more  promising.  Some  of the capital  that  dd not find its
way into domestic  manufacturing  was invested  in newly industrializing  countries;
some,  attracted  by high  interest  rates,  went  to finance  rising  domestic  budget  deficits
and financial  speculation;  some  did not materialize,  as manufacturing  profits were
depressed  and household  javings  rates fell.
64. Labor must also be redeployed  if it is  to contribute  to  new comparative
advantages.  Its capacity  to do so is limited  by the scarcity  of new investment.  Its
willingness  to adapt is greatest  when opportnities for employment  are plentiful,  in
growing  industries  offering  attractive  wages,  in places  with good living conditions.
Tlhe  bulk of Europe's  farmers  thus shifted  to industry  and  services  between  1945  and
1975, with little  pain, voluntarily,  often  eagerly:  there was ample  demand  even for
its limited skills, with better earnings and living conditions.  Similarly  did textile
workers  move  to electrical  industries  in eager droves.  But  what alternative  do a fifty
year old farmer, assembly  line  worker  or coal miner have today?
65. Their  opportunities  might  improve  with  better  skills,  but  the stringency  of budgets
has limited  training  efforts everywhere.  In any case, the large numbers  of trained
unemployed  (from  youngish  retirees  to workers  with  only  slightly  mis-matched  skills)
throws  doubt on the link between  skills  and  jobs and reduces  the incentive  to incur
the effort and costs of training.
66. The criticism  of protection  often  includes  the argument  that  the gain  to consumers
from cheaper  imports  exceeds  the costs of fully  compensating  the unemployed  for
their lost incomes.  Thus  Pareian welare is raised by trade liberalization.  Indeed,
most industrial  countries  reduce  the numbers  of formally  unemployed  through  early
retirement  programs,  and also informally,  by leaving  little  hope of new  jobs to those30
above  fifty.
67. But trade economists  should  not disregard  the evolution  of the economics  and
politics of taxation, fiscality  and public choice. Taxation and other compulsory
contributions  to unemployment  benefits,  through  transfer  payments,  are not costless.
In the 1980s,  body politics  throughout  the industrial  world have behaved  as if the
marginal  costs  of levying  taxes  were enormous.  Fiscal  economists  have  advanced  the
theoretical  analysis  of these  costs, and while  their  opinions  are divided,  a substantial
body  of professional  opinion  now  holds  that the economic  costs  of marginal  taxes  are
indeed high. Whether  the constraints  on compulsory  levies are real or imagined,
raising unemployment  compensation  or pensions  therefore  has real welfare costs,
which in the short run may well outweigh  efficiency  and other welfare  gains from
additional  imports.  Such  calculations  need  not  be taken  any  more seriously  than  those
of some  trade models;  but as long as politics  favor lower taxes, the constraints  are
real, and transfer  payments  to the unemployed  carry true economic  costs.
68. None of this should be construed  as arguments  in favor of protectionism.
Permanently  sheltering  domestic  producers  from imports  is clearly  not the road to
greater  efficiency  and  resumed  growth.  Even  the temporary  use of protection  is risky:
every example  of a firm using  protection-padded  profits  to gear up for competition
can be matched  by at least one where protection  prolonged  the agony.  But import
competition  alone  may  not lead  to appropriate  restructuring  either,  just to a withering
of the industrial  structure,  depletion  of skills  and of capital; and  ultimately  to forms
of protectionism  which may be no less unavoidable  for being, by themselves,
unhelpful.31
CONCLUSION
69. Protectionism  continued  to dominate  world agricultural  trade in the 1980s,  and
to dampen  its expansion.  Outside  this limited  area,  however,  far from  being  a decade
of rampant  protectionism,  the 1980s  saw an unprecedented  surge in the growth  rate
and market shares  of manufactures  imports  into the industrial  countries.  Free trade
may  have  remained  an ideal  remote  from reality;  but no more  remote  than  the reality
of monopolistic,  friction-prone,  ignorant  domestic  markets from the ideal perfect
competition.  If a simple  paradigm  is sought,  then  outside  of agriculture  that of free
trade fits reality and serves  policy-makers  well. Many developing  countries  have
succeeded  in accelerating  their  development  through  strategies  based  on manufactures
exports  to industrial  countries.  These  markets  have  remained  wide open  to them,  their
supposed  protectionism  no more than a minor frictional  cost.  Those developing
countries  that have not done well in manufactures  exports should  look to their own
circumstances  and policies  for explanations  of their lack  of success,  not to imagined
protectionism  in industrial  country  markets.
70. Yet in the industrial  countries,  this period of free trade coincided  with lower
growth  rates and heightened  malaise.  The value  of the paradigm  is not to fit reality
perfectly - no simple  paradigm  can - but to indicate  that the way to improving
industrial  country  performance  does  not lie in removing  the remaining  imperfections
in the model. Ever freer trade should be sought, would be useful; even more
important,  the gaLis  of the  past must  be consolidated  and  protectionist  threats  credibly
countered;  but whatever  further  trade liberalization  is feasible  will not, by itself, do
much  to bring  about faster  growth.
71. Worse:  unless  faster  growth  is brought  about, and  it must  be by other means,  the
conditions  for free trade may not be preserved. The first duty of the industrial
countries,  to themselves  and to the world, is to re-establish  the conditions  of faster
growth; the first duty of economists  is to finds the policies  that will do so. The
solution  does not lie in further  reduction  of the remaining  barriers  to free trade. But
unless a solution  is found, and put into practice, trade barriers may well rise in
reaction  to perceived  and actual  difficulties,  and, by rising, aggravate  them.32
ANNEX  TABLE I - I
MERCHANDISE  TRADE  BY  REGIONS,  MAJOR  TRADING  PARTNERS  AND  PRODUCT,  1980, 1985, 1989  AND  1990.
EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY.
(Billion  dollars)
U.  S.  Japan  developing  EFTA  WORLD  intra-EC
countries  excludIng
Year  intra-EC
exp  limp  exp  imp  exp  imp  exp  iop  exp  imp  exp  imp
Food  1980  2.9 12.4  0.9  0.2  14.0  25.5  4.6  3.3  26.4  44.9  49.6  49.5
1985  4.4  6.4  1.1  0.2  11.4  22.6  3.8  2.9  24.0  35.1  45.8  46.7
1989  4.9  6.8  2.6  0.2  15.7  28.9  6.8  5.5  34.6  45.6  84.9  83.1
1990  5.6  7.4  2.8  0.2  16.9  32.0  8.6  6.7  39.1  51.4  100.8  99.9
Rai Materials  1980  0.3  3.1  0.1  0.2  1.2  9.6  1.6  6.6  3.9  23.4  9.1  8.9
1985  0.5  2.2  0.2  0.1  1.2  7.3  1.5  4.2  4.2  16.3  8.5  8.7
1989  0.7  3.6  0.4  0.2  1.8  10.5  2.7  7.9  6.4  27.2  14.9  15.1
1990  0.6  3.9  0.3  0.2  1.9  10.4  2.9  8.3  6.7  28.1  16.3  16.8
Ores and Other 1980  0.3  2.8  0.1  0.0  0.4  7.6  0.8  1.5  2.0  14.2  6.1  6.5
1985  0.2  1.3  0.1  0.0  0.4  5.8  0.9  1.1  1.8  10.2  4.5  5.1
Minerals  1989  0.2  2.1  0.2  0.0  0.9  8.0  1.4  1.9  3.2  14.7  8.3  9.1
190  0.3  1.7  0.2  0.0  0.9  7.9  1.4  2.0  3.1  14.3  8.3  9.3
Fuels  1980  2.4  2.9  0.0  0.0  4.1  113.2  6.7  8.7  18.0  139.7  37.3  36.2
1985  5.1  3.1  0.1  0.0  2.1  64.9  5.9  12.4  17.3  97.7  40.4  39.4
1989  3.8  3.1  0.2  0.0  1.9  44.9  4.1  11.1  13.5  71.3  24.3  23.7
1990  4.8  3.8  0.1  0.0  2.4  58.6  5.8  14.9  17.7  92.5  31.9  32.1
Non-Ferrous  1980  1.0  2.4  0.2  0.3  1.4  6.2  3.8  3.1  7.0  13.5  11.7  11.4
Metals  1985  1.1  0.6  0.2  0.1  1.3  3.3  1.5  2.3  4.5  7.4  7.5  7.6
1989  1.3  0.9  0.5  0.1  2.1  6.6  3.0  5.5  7.4  16.0  16.3  16.7
1990  1.4  1.1  0.5  0.2  2.1  6.7  3.3  5.8  7.7  16.3  16.9  17.4
Total  Primary  1980  6.9  23.6  1.3  0.7  21.1  162.1  17.5  23.1  57.2  235.7 113.8 112.5
1985  11.2  13.5  1.6  0.4  16.5  104.0  13.5  22.9  51.8  166.6 106.8 107.5
Products  1989  10.8  16.5  3.9  0.6  22.4  98.8  18.0  31.9  65.1  174.7 148.6 147.8
1990  12.6  17.9  4.0  0.7  24.1  115.6  22.0  37.8  74.3  202.7 174.2 175.5
Iron  and Steel  1980  2.0  0.5  0.1  0.7  7.3  1.3  4.0  3.3  16.9  7.0  19.2  19.8
1985  2.9  0.2  0.1  0.2  6.2  1.0  3.0  2.9  15.8  5.2  14.5  14.7
1989  3.1  0.5  0.2  0.3  7.1  2.4  5.4  6.1  18.7  11.0  29.7  30.0
1990  3.1  0.4  0.2  0.4  7.2  2.1  5.9  6.7  18.3  11.7  33.8  33.9
Chemicals  1980  3.4  6.2  1.5  0.8  16.4  2.6  9.5  5.2  35.7  17.2  43.0  43.6
1985  5.8  5.8  1.9  1.0  16.0  3.0  8.3  5.7  37.2  17.7  43.6  44.4
1989  8.6  9.5  4.0  2.5  21.8  5.5  16.3  12.5  58.0  33.2  81.8  85.7
1990  9.4  10.7  4.5  2.9  24.7  6.1  19.4  15.3  65.2  38.6  97.5  102.6
Other Semi-  1980  3.8  3.3  0.5  1.1  14.6  4.8  11.4  14.5  32.4  26.6  36.4  36.1
1985  5.1  2.1  0.6  0.8  11.8  3.8  6.2  10.3  25.8  18.9  29.2  29.2
Manufactures  1989  7.8  4.1  1.9  1.8  17.2  10.4  13.2  21.8  43.1  41.2  61.8  61.7
1990  8.0  5.0  2.2  2.1  18.6  12.1  16.1  26.5  48.2  49.3  76.5  76.733
ANNEX  TABLE  I  - 11
MERCHANDISE  TRADE  BY  REGIONS,  MAJOR  TRADING  PARTNERS  AND  PRODUCT,  1980,  1985,  1989  AND  1990. cUROPEAN
COMMUNITY.
(Billion  dollars)
U.  S.  Japan  developing  EFTA  WORLD  intra-EC
countries  excluding
Year  Sntra-EC
exp  Imp  exp  Inp  exp  inp  exp  Smp  exp  imp  exp  imrp
Machinery  and 1980 16.4  22.2  1.9 12.9  61.3  5.9 26.9 14.2  115.9  58.0  109.4  106.7
Transport  1985  27.2 23.3  2.0 16.5  46.5  7.4 23.8  13.0  109.4  63.7  102.6  98.8
Equipment  1989  38.2 44.9  7.3 39.7 67.4 22.5  49.9 31.2  180.1  145.3  243.3  230.8
1990  44.6 53.7 10.3  45.6 80.3 28.2 61.0  40.3  217.7  176.9  300.8  288.1
Power  1980  1.2  1.7  0.1  0.1  3.7  0.4  0.9  0.5  6.2  3.0  3.1  3.2
Generating 1985  2.3  2.4  0.1  0.1  2.8  0.6  0.8  0.5  6.3  3.9  3.1  3.0
Machinery  1989  3.6  4.6  0.1  0.4  3.8  0.9  1.6  1.2  9.6  7.6  6.7  6.4
1990  5.4  5.8  0.2  0.4  4.9  0.9  1.9  1.5 13.1  9.4  7.8  7.8
Other  Non-  1980  4.5  4.9  0.8  1.5 22.4  0.4 10.0  5.9 43.1 13.6  30.1 29.8
1985  6.7  3.9  0.8  1.9 17.2  0.5  7.6  5.0 37.1 12.2  23.8 23.6
Electrical  1989  10.9  6.9  2.1  5.5  24.7  1.8  16.3  11.9  62.2  27.6  56.8  56.2
Nachinery  1990  12.2  7.8  2.8  6.3  30.6  2.3  20.5  15.6  75.6  34.0  70.7  70.8
Office  and  1980  1.5  7.3  0.3  4.9  5.8  2.7  3.3  2.0  11.3  17.2  16.4  15.2
Telecom-  1985  3.1  10.0  0.2  7.6  5.8  4.0  4.3  2.3  14.2  24.6  21.2  19.4
munications  1989  4.9  17.3  0.5  17.4  7.9  13.1  8.2  5.0  23.5  54.7  46.1  42.2
Equipment  1990  5.2  18.9  0.6  19.7  9.6  16.8  9.5  6.4  27.7  63.9  55.3  52.0
Electrical  1980  0.8  2.1  0.2  0.7  6.6  0.5  3.5  2.0  11.9  5.7  11.7  11.9
1985  1.7  2.5  0.2  1.3  5.1  0.7  3.0  1.8  11.1  6.7  11.1  10.9
MachInery and 1989  3.0  4.0  0.6  3.3  7.0  2.7  6.5  4.4  19.2  15.2  24.6  24.3
Apparatus  1990  3.3  4.6  0.9  3.7  8.4  3.4  8.0  5.7  23.7  18.4  30.7  30.9
Automotive  1980  6.2  0.9  0.4  3.9  13.1  0.4  7.0  2.4  27.5  8.2  37.6  36.5
1985  9.8  0.6  0.6  4.4  8.8  0.7  6.3  2.7  27.0  9.3  34.6  34.1
Products  1989 10.5  1.7  3.5 10.9 11.9  1.7 13.4  6.9 41.1 22.6  87.6 82.7
1990  12.3  2.2  5.2  12.6  13.0  1.7  16.3  8.5  49.0  26.7  109.4 103.7
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ANNEX  TABLE  I  - III.
MERCHANDISE  TRADE  8Y  REGIONS,  MAJOR  TRADING  PARTNERS  AND  PRODUCT,  1980,  1985,  1989  AND  1990.
EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY.
(Billion  dollars)
U.  S.  Japan  developing EFTA  WORLD
countries  excluding  intra-EC
Year  intra-EC
Other  1980  2.2  4.8  0.2  1.9  8.5  1.5  2.0  1.3 15.2 11.1  9.4  9.2
Transport  1985  3.5  3.9  0.2  1.1  5.8  0.8  1.7  0.7 12.5  7.1  8.7  7.9
Equipment  1989  5.3 10.4  0.4  2.3 11.0  2.3  3.8  1.8 22.8 17.7  21.3 19.0
1990  6.1 14.4  0.5  2.9 12.7  3.0  4.6  2.5 26.7 24.4 26.6 22.8
Textiles  1980  0.7  1.3  0.4  0.4  3.5  3.6  3.4  2.1  9.4  8.0  16.0  15.7
1985  1.4  0.5  0.4  0.4  2.9  2.8  2.6  2.1  8.9  6.5  14.2  13.9
1989  1.8  1.1  1.0  0.8  4.4  5.4  5.1  4.1  14.0  12.1  25.1  25.2
1990  1.9  1.3  1.2  0.9  5.1  6.7  6.2  5.0  16.4  14.8  30.8  31.2
Clothing  1980  0.4  0.4  0.3  0.1  1.3  6.2  2.7  1.7  4.9  9.6  10.5  10.9
1985  1.4  0.1  0.3  0.1  1.0  5.3  3.0  1.4  6.2  8.3  9.6  9.3
1989  1.9  0.3  1.2  0.2  1.6  13.5  5.6  5.0  11.0  20.5  18.7  17.9
1990  1.9  0.5  1.6  0.2  2.0  17.7  7.1  6.6  13.3  27.1  24.6  23.6
other  Consumer  1980  4.3  5.7  0.9  2.9  10.0  4.8  8.5  5.4  25.4  20.2  30.2  30.3
1985  9.0  5.9  1.0  3.1  9.9  4.3  8.1  4.8  30.4  19.6  27.1  26.8
Goods  1989 12.1  11.6  3.4  6.5  13.1  13.8  17.5  11.1  50.6  45.4  58.6  58.0
1990 13.3 13.6  4.4  7.6 15.2 16.8  21.7 13.9 59.6  55.0 74.2 73.7
Total  1980  30.9  39.6  5.3  19.0  114.5  29.2  66.5  46.4  240.7  146.5 264.7 263.0
Manufactures  1985  52.8  37.9  6.3  22.2  94.4  27.5  54.9  40.2  233.8  139.9 240.8 237.1
1989  73.3  71.S  19.0  51.7  132.5  73.5  113.0  91.9  375.5 308.8 518.9 509.2
1990  82.2  85.2  24.3  59.7  153.2  89.6  137.3 114.2 438.7 373.4 638.1 629.6
Total  a  1980  38.6  66.0  6.7  19.7 138.2 195.3  86.3  73.0 305.0 393.9 384.6 380.1
1985  65.1  53.1  8.0  22.7  113.7 133.9  69.8  66.4  292.2 314.9 352.8 349.3
1989  85.1  91.2  23.1  52.6  158.6 176.8 133.5 128.1 456.0 499.3 674.4 667.9
1990  95.9  105.8  28.5  60.7  181.1 210.1 162.3 156.8 530.6 593.6 820.9 818.3
a Inetuding  commodities not  classified  according to  kind.
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ANNEX  TABLE  11  -I
MERCHANDISE  TRADE  BY REGIONS,  MAJOR  TRADING  PARTNERS  AND  PRODUCT,  1980, 1985, 1989 AND  1990.
UNITED  STATES
(Billion  doltars)
EC  Japan developing  World  Canada
countries
Year
exp  imp  exp  imp  exp  lop  oxp  lop  exp  lop
Food  1980 10.98  3.28 5.74 0.32 15.81  14.19 39.77  20.60 2.45 1.83
1985  6.20 5.22 5.45 0.54 11.68  15.19 28.59  25.26 2.25 2.98
1989  7.19  5.25 9.69 0.37 17.18  16.56 42.78  28.16  3.71 4.36
1990  8.22 5.65  10.12  0.35 15.23  17.86 42.42  30.06  4.80 4.67
Raw  Materials  1980  2.64 0.34  3.14 0.04  4.26  1.88  11.43 6.42 0.95  4.05
1985  2.00 0.61 2.17  0.12  3.59  1.94  9.07  7.63 0.90  4.80
1989  3.34 0.81  4.92 0.14  6.36  3.07  16.53  10.75  1.52 6.58
1990  3.57 0.76  4.75 0.13  6.60  2.68  16.98 9.91 1.65 6.20
Ores  and  Other  1980  2.36 0.29 1.21  0.02  1.25  3.13  6.39  4.90 1.29 1.40
Minerals  1985  1.06  0.27 0.83 U.03  1.09  2.24  3.99  3.62 0.83 1.01
1989  1.55  0.37 1.48 0.05  2.05  3.37  6.98  5.58 1.29  1.63
1990  1.20  0.37 1.33  0.04  2.19  3.50  6.40  5.73 1.20 1.70
Fuels  1980  2.42 2.59 1.73  0.06  1.63  70.35  8.47 82.25  2.33 6.98
1985  2.85 5.81 1.81  0.07  3.12 37.83  10.06  55.75 1.60  10.03
1989  2.7'4  4.02 1.51 0.16  3.60 41.85  9.95 56.09 1.72  8.05
1990  3.78 4.87 1.48  0.10  4.45 51.22  12.32  68.74  2.17  10.35
Non-Ferrous  Metals  1980  1.91  0.87 0.86 0.49  1.04  3.34  5.11  7.71 0.66 2.45
1985  0.46  1.34  0.42  0.54  0.55  2.60  2.04  7.13 0.55 2.14
1989  0.73  1.37  1.46  0.40  1.41  3.52  5.04  11.04  1.35  4.78
1990  0.78 1.37  1.58 0.48  1.44  3.23  5.29  9.99 1.42  3.97
Total  Primary  1980  20.32  7.37  12.68  0.93 23.96  92.91 71.18  121.88  7.69  16.71
Products  1985 12.57  13.25  10.68  1.29 20.03  59.82 53.75  99.39  6.14  20.95
1989 15.55  11.82  19.06  1.12 30.58  68.38 81.28  111.63  9.60  25.41
1990 17.55  13.02  19.26  1.10 29.91  78.50 83.42  124.43  11.24  26.89
Iron  and  Steel  1980  0.46 2.15  0.05 3.28  2.02  1.36  3.24  8.15 0.64 1.04
1985  0.16  3.37 0.05 3.35  0.57  2.38  1.44 11.19  0.60 1.22
1989  0.36  3.34 0.27 2.68  1.90  2.84  3.69 11.38  0.97 1.68
1990  0.37 3.13  0.21 2.34  1.38  2.87  3.49 10.68  1.44 1.55
Chemicals  1980  5.54 3.57  2.00 0.75 10.14 1.24  21.13  8.96 2.39 2.60
1985  5.81 6.49  2.88 1.48  8.95  2.78  21.98 15.10  3.05 2.76
1989  9.94 9.56  4.72 2.50 16.41 3.90  37.87 21.77  5.22 4.09
1990 10.68  10.15  4.62 2.51 16.50 4.43  39.47 23.66  6.14 4.59
Other  Semi-  1980  2.56 3.54 0.61  2.18  5.57  4.67  11.59  15.80  2.34 4.74
Manufactures  1985  1.64  5.68 0.72  3.60  3.80  8.14  9.44 26.22  2.87 7.32
1989  3.29 7.76 1.73  4.14  6.87 12.34 17.87  36.22  5.41  10.16
1990  3.78  7.85  1.94  3.90  7.56  11.84  19.88  35.74  6.01  10.31
Machinery and  1980  20.13 16.28  3.88  22.25  39.03  10.12  88.72  63.84 21.05 12.63
Transport  1985  21.43 28.11  5.88  54.85  37.55  24.61  101.95 141.84 32.12 29.43
Equipment  1989  42.74 37.07 12.33 75.93  59.92  52.32  165.95 210.81 43.88 39.29
1990  47.86 40.15 15.30 71.61  66.13  54.06  182.60 213.26 45.29 41.1836
ANNEX  TABLE  II  -II
MERCHANDISE  TRADE  BY  REGIONS,  MAJOR  TRADING  PARTNERS  AND  PRODUCT,  1980, 1985, 1989 AND  1990.
UNITED  STATES
(Billion  dolLars)
EC  Japan  developing  Wortd  Canada
countries
Year
exp  Imp exp  inp  exp  Imp  exp  1ip  exp  fop
Power  Generating  1980  1.46  0.99 0.20  0.17  2.57  0.14  5.00  1.90  0.53 0.43
Machinery  1985  1.89  2.27 0.37  0.38  2.07  0.42  5.41  3.86 0.72 0.57
1989  4.24 3.45 0.67  0.68  3.16  0.89  9.91  6.41 1.34  0.83
1990  4.41 4.34  0.79  0.74  3.21  0.96  10.13  7.56 1.22 1.01
Other  Non-  1980  4.56 4.84 0.90 2.26 13.61 0.81  25.92 11.01  5.75 1.90
Electrical  1985  3.70 7.49 1.03  5.85  9.31  2.21  19.90  19.59  4.98 2.39
Machinery  1989  6.73  11.63  1.98  10.05  14.31 4.81  32.61  32.37  8.32 3.57
1990  7.45  12.61  2.07  9.06 14.94 4.68  34.62  32.17  8.69 3.40
Office  and  1980  6.30 1.22  1.01  4.96  6.65  6.33  17.21 13.61  2.38 0.92
Telecommunication  1985  8.70 2.72 2.11  18.95  10.27  13.38 26.43  37.28  4.24 1.89
Equipment  1989 15.18  3.97 5.43  26.08 17.95  29.12  47.38  63.20  7.09 3.59
1990 16.33  4.09 6.02  24.66 19.54  30.14  51.66  63.37  7.90 3.94
Electrical  1980  1.73  0.97  0.38  1.14  2.84  1.66  6.24  4.4. 0.97 0.44
Machinery and  1985  1.95  2.11  0.55  3.14  3.19  4.87  7.53  11.51  1.52  0.89
Apparatus  1989  3.29 3.13 1.00  4.36  6.59  8.68  14.72 18.13  3.31 1.38
1990  3.65 3.38 1.02  4.67  6.69  8.83  16.55 19.69  4.60 2.20
Automotive  1980  1.20  6.19 0.19  11.85 5.35  0.45  16.74  26.94  9.54  7.87
Products  1985  0.98  10.46  0.22  24.53 3.51  2.52  23.12  60.25  18.02  20.86
1989  2.45  10.36  0.90  32.30  6.37  6.75  30.85  78.76  20.22  27.42
1990  2.92  11.52  1.52  30.12  7.85  7.35  32.55  78.51  19.48  27.71
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ANNEX  TABLE  11  - II
MERCHANDISE  TRADE  BY REGIONS,  KAJOR  TRADING  PARTNERS  AND PRODUCT,  1980,  1985,  1989  AND 1990.
UNITED  STATES
(Billion  dollars)
EC  Japan  developing  World  Canada
countries
Year
exp  imp  exp  imp  exp  imp  exp  lop  exp  imp
other  Transport  1980  4.89  2.06  1.21  1.88  7.97  0.68  17.59  5.90  1.87  1.07
Equipment  1985  4.21  3.06  1.60  2.01  9.22  1.18  19.49  9.35  2.58  2.84
1989  10.85 4.53  2.35  2.46  11.53  2.07  30.47  11.94 3.60  2.51
1990  13.10 4.21  3.88  2.37  13.92  2.09  37.09  11.97 3.40  2.92
Textiles  1980  1.12 0.67  0.11  0.39  1.66  1.30  3.76  2.54 0.71  0.07
1985  0.45  1.41  0.11  0.75  1.23  2.41  2.55  4.98  0.66  0.19
1989  0.97  1.79  0.30 0.64  1.87  3.35  4.37  6.42  1.08 0.37
1990  1.20 1.83  0.27 0.61  2.20  3.61  5.04  6.73  1.22 0.41
Clothing  1980  0.33  0.44  0.08  0.22  0.64  6.11  1.26  6.94  0.09  0.05
1985  0.10  1.53  0.03  0.52  0.55  13.59  0.78  16.20 0.07  0.20
1989  0.29  1.80  0.22  0.24  1.47 23.08  2.22  26.03 0.18  0.26
1990  0.41  1.85  0.31 0.17  1.53 24.09  2.56  26.98 0.24  0.25
Other  Consumer  1980  5.77  4.50  1.18 2.64  5.10  8.06  16.20 18.00 2.86  1.55
Goods  1985  4.85  9.22  1.58 5.68  5.20  15.92  16.11 35.34 3.34  2.73
1989  9.73  11.72 5.04 8.73  9.21  27.93  32.74 53.86 6.29  3.28
1990  11.20  12.52 5.72 9.39  10.40 30.04  37.44 57.79 7.45 3.33
Total  Manufactures  1980 35.91  31.16  7.91  31.70 64.17 32.86  145.91  124.23  30.08  22.68
1985 34.44  55.80  11.25  70.24 57.89 69.82  154.23  250.87  42.70  44.05
1989 67.32  73.04  24.61  94.85 97.66  125.79 264.71  366.48  63.03  59.13
1990  75.52  77.47  28.38  90.53  105.70  130.96 290.49  374.85  67.79  61.62
Total a  1980  58.71  39.94  20.79  32.96 91.80  127.42 225.64  253.00  40.34  42.00
1985 48.26  71.57  22.19  72.28 81.96  132.56 219.16  361.40  53.23  69.42
1989  86.58  88.75  44.56  97.11  134.46  198.11  363.63  493.01  78.26  89.44
1990  98.02  95.45  48.58  93.07  143.14  213.88 392.87  516.72  82.96  93.69
a Including  commodities  not  classiffed  according  to kind.
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ANNEX  TABLE  III  -I
MERCHANDISE  TRADE  BY REGIONS,  MAJOR  TRADING  PARTNERS  AND  PRODUCT,  1980,  1985,  1989  AND 1990.
JAPAN.
(Billion  dollars)
United  State  EC  developing  World
countries
Year
exp  imp  exp  imp  exp  imp  exp  imp
rood  1980  0.26  6.57  0.19  1.07  1.18  7.76  1.70 16.88
1985  0.42  6.25  0.13  1.14  0.81  8.56  1.43 17.78
1989  0.32 11.45 0.17 3.05  1.17  15.80  1.73 33.45
1990  0.30 11.58 0.17  3.32  1.18  15.78  1.1  34.00
Raw  Materials  1980  0.03 4.03  0.15  0.13  0.95  6.72  1.22  13.03
1985  0.07 2.63  0.11  0.23  0.85  4.77  1.12  9.12
1989  0.11 5.93  0.19  0.49  1.15  8.66  1.54  18.43
1990  0.11 5.77  0.20  0.44  1.19  7.49  1.59  16.46
Ores  and  Other  1980  0.01  1.46 0.01  0.11  0.17  7.14  0.25  9.66
1985  0.02  0.95 0.02  0.16  0.14  5.60  0.23  7.33
Minerals  1989  0.03  1.57 0.03  0.32  0.34  8.17  0.42  11.16
1990  0.02  1.41 0.02  0.36  0.28  8.10  0.36  11.00
Fuels  1980  0.04  2.10  0.02 0.03  0.36  66.84  0.50 70.05
1985  0.06  1.95  0.03 0.07  0.33  52.27  0.53  55.87
1989  0.15  1.79  0.03  0.19  0.72  39.84  0.96  43.84
1990  0.10  1.73  0.02  0.17  1.11  53.40  1.27  57.45
Non-Ferrous  Metal  1980  0.53  0.8C 0.23  0.20  0.94  2.68  1.79  4.36
1985  0.52  0.50  0.04  0.24  0.78  2.64  1.38  3.95
1989  0.45  1.54 0.13  0.77  1.47  5.84  2.09  9.82
1990  0.54  1.64  0.15  0.76  1.48  5.61  2.23  9.76
Total  Primary  1980  0.88  14.95 0.60  1.54  3.59 91.12  5.46  113.98
1985  1.08  12.28 0.34  1.84  2.91  73.84  4.69  94.05
Products  1989  1.06  22.28 0.53  4.81  4.86  78.33  6.74  116.70
1990  1.07  22.13 0.56  5.05  5.25  90.38  7.16  128.68
Iron  and Steel  1980  2.72  0.06 0.62  0.05  10.57  0.66  15.45  0.89
1985  2.82  0.04 0.24  0.08  9.29  1.18  13.57  1.48
1989  2.38  0.34  0.37  0.15  10.89  3.88  14.80  5.04
1990  2.25  0.27  0.46  0.18  9.02  3.41  12.52  4.56
Chemicals  1980  0.77  2.55 0.76  1.71  4.53  1.05  6.65  5.95
1985  1.40  3.47 0.99  2.20  4.64  1.44  7.59  7.96
1989  2.54  5.34  2.38  4.95  8.86  3.08  14.69  15.07
1990  2.48  5.38  2.84  5.17  9.64  2.85  15.78  15.22
Other  Semi-  1980  1.83  0.78  0.94  0.59  5.51  1.05  8.84  2.71
1985  2.83  0.86  0.71  0.64  4.86  1.10  8.98  2.96
Manufactures  1989  4.00  1.96  1.58  2.06  6.52  5.30  12.94  10.19
1990  3.75  2.24  1.81  2.34  7.24  5.63  13.68  11.08
Machinery  and  1980 22.01 4.25  11.5a 2L27 34.94  1.17  75.87  8.39
1985  50.84  6.50  15.18  2.04  41.61  1.49  119.20  10.57
Transport  1989 74.29  12.58  36.32  7.93  66.34  6.34  193.67  28.11
Equipment  1990 71.59  15.83  40.36  11.13 72.56  7.28  202.93 36.0539
ANNEX  TABLE  III  -II
MERCHANDISE  TRADE  BY REGIONS,  MAJOR  TRADING  PARTNERS  AND  PRODUCT,  1980,  1985,  1989  AND 1990.
JAPAN.
(Billion  dollars)
United  States  EC  developing  World
countries
Year
exp  imp  exp  imp  exp  mop  exp  imp
Power  Generating  1980  0.17  0.35  0.07 0.09  1.38  0.05  1.68  0.52
1985  0.33  0.77  0.11  0.07  1.58  0.10  2.14  0.96
Machinery  1989  0.83  1.08  0.34 0.15  1.81  0.31  3.11  1.59
1990  0.82  1.14  0.35 0.23  2.18  0.36  3.49  1.79
Other  Non-  1980  2.16  0.97  1.37 0.87  8.72  0.10  13.41  2.27
1985  5.04  0.99  1.76 0.78  10.00  0.20  18.32  2.33
Electrical  1989  9.69  1.94 5.08  2.26  18.08  0.97 35.27  5.85
Machinery  1990  8.57  2.24  5.77 3.00  19.31  1.16 35.88  7.35
Office  and  1980  5.05  1.27 4.73  0.30  7.03  0.58  17.98  2.21
1985  16.94  2.10  7.05  0.20  10.65  0.74  36.73  3.11
Telecomiunicatio  1989  26.33  5.72  16.13  0.62  19.10  3.46  65.00  9.93
Equipment  1990 24.87 6.58  17.71 0.73  20.63  3.80 67.01  11.26
Electrical  1980  0.99  0.50  0.64  0.21  4.15  0.20  6.13  0.98
1985  2.57  0.86  1.21  0.24  4.96  0.27  9.27  1.45
Machinery  and  1989  4.08  1.46 2.90  0.64  7.97  1.15  15.81  3.39
Apparatus  1990  4.34  1.66  3.23  0.83  8.31  1.38  16.78  4.08
Automotive  1980  11.16  0.18  3.21  0.41  10.00  0.04  26.10  0.65
1985  23.01  0.13  3.82  0.59  11.07  0.06  41.14  0.81
Products  1989  31.08  0.66  10.15  3.78  15.34  0.20  63.07  4.83
1990  30.73  0.94  10.97  5.80  17.28  0.26  66.23  7.32
SwU  GATT  dMa fla.  OSvdo*q  Comtes'  am  tw  mm of Afd-  L_fn  *ns.  MIdS  E  at  Al  n*w  Jau.40
ANNEX  TABLE  III  - 111.
MERCHANDISE  TRADE  BY  REGIONS,  MAJOR  TRADING  PARTNERS  AND  PRODUCT,  1980,  1985.  1989  AND 1990.
JAPAN.
(Biltion  dollars)
United  State  EC  developing  World
countries
Year
exp  inp  exp  inp  exp  imp  exp  imp
Other  Transport 1980  2.49  0.98  1.55 0.37  3.65  0.19  10.57  1.76
1985  2.94  1.65  1.24 0.16  3.37  0.10  11.59  1.92
Equipment  1989  2.27  1.72  1.72 0.47  4.04  0.24  11.41  2.50
1990  2.26  3.26  2.32 0.54  4.84  0.31  13.54  4.26
Textiles  1980  0.38  0.13  0.34 0.41  4.00  1.04  5.12  1.66
1985  0.63  0.13  0.38 0.40  3.64  1.30  4.94  1.90
1989  0.63  0.32  0.63  1.06  4.00  2.81  5.53  4.35
1990  0-59  0.32  0.75  1.21  4.24  2.38  5.86  4.11
Clothing  1980  0.21  0.09  0.07  0.32  0.15  1.10  0.49  1.54
1985  0.44  0.04  0.06  0.29  0.15  1.66  0.71  2.01
1989  0.22  0.23  0.12  1.36  0.17  7.30  0.57  8.97
1990  0.15  0.32  0.15  1.78  0.21  6.54  0.57  8.74
Other  Consumer  1980  2.52  1.48 2.85  1.07  4.11  1.02  10.32  3.89
1985  5.32  1.89 2.98  1.19  5.14  1.45  1&.46  4.87
Goods  1989  7.25  4.58  5.57  5.13  8.03  5.64  22.23 16.63
1990  7.42  5.20  6.11  7.38  8.77  5.94  23.80 20.21
Total  Manufacture  1980 30.42 9.35  17.16 6.42 63.81  7.11  122.73 25.03
1985 64.29  12.94  20.53 6.83  69.32  9.62  169.44 31.75
1989 91.30  25.35  46.99  22.64  104.80 34.36  264.43 88.36
1990 88.24  29.56  52.47  29.18  111.69 34.04  275.13 99.95
Total a  1980 31.74  24.45  18.12 8.32 68.03 98.80  129.81  140.53
1985 66.04  25.90  21.03 9.30  72.97 84.71  175.90  129.54
1989 93.70  48.57  48.19  28.28  111.26  114.47  275.17  210.85
1990 90.88  52.79  53.85  35.14  118.72  126.65  286.95  234.80
a Including  comnmodities  not classified  according  to kind.
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